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THE DECLINE OF THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF
EVOLVING NORMS
JEFFREY FAGAN* AND VALERIE WESTt
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Atkins v.
Virginia1 holding that the execution of mentally retarded persons violated
the Eighth Amendment, legal scholars, advocates, and journalists began to
speculate that the Court would next turn its attention to the question of the
execution of persons who were juveniles-below eighteen years of age-
fat the time they committed homicide. Following the Atkins decision, four
Justices expressed the view that the rationale of Atkins also supported the
conclusion that execution of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional.2 A
constitutional test of capital punishment for juveniles was inevitable.
The Atkins Court held that capital punishment was an uncon-
stitutionally cruel and unusual punishment for the mentally retarded for two
reasons. First, the Court concluded that the impairments associated with
mental retardation both reduced the culpability of the mentally retarded,
making death a disproportionate punishment for them, and created a
"special risk of wrongful execution."3  Second, the Court found that a
national consensus had emerged that death is an excessive punishment for
" Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University. Thanks to the Wallace
Global Fund, the Open Society Institute, and Columbia Law School for their generous
support. Excellent research assistance was provided by Gabriel Miller, Monica Shah, and
Amanda Beth Geller.
t Research Analyst, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, and
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, New York University.
1 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for writ of habeas corpus) (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); see also
Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (joined by Justice Breyer).
' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
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the mentally retarded.4
As evidence of that national consensus, the Court pointed to the
growing number of states that expressly barred the imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded: since 1989, when the Court had last
considered the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded,5 the
number of states with such legislation had grown from two to eighteen.6 In
addition, the Court observed that, even in states where the death penalty
was theoretically a permissible punishment for the mentally retarded, it was
rarely imposed: since 1989, only five states had executed offenders known
to be mentally retarded.7
Like the question of execution of the mentally retarded, the question of
the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles was last visited by the
Supreme Court in 1989. That year, in Stanford v. Kentucky,8 the Court
concluded that the death penalty was not inherently disproportionate to the
culpability of adolescents and that individualized assessments could reliably
sort out which juveniles were sufficiently morally culpable.9 And it held
that no national consensus barred the imposition of capital punishment on
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old juveniles.l°
The Supreme Court returned to the juvenile death penalty in January
2004 when it granted certiorari to review the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in Simmons v. Roper." In Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court
relied on the logic of Atkins to hold that the execution of persons who
committed homicide before reaching their eighteenth birthday is
unconstitutional. 12 The Court cited the immaturity and consequent reduced
culpability of juvenile offenders, 13 plus the special risk of wrongful
execution for juvenile offenders, due in part to the risk of false confession. 14
In addition, the Simmons court concluded that, since Stanford was decided
in 1989, a national consensus had emerged opposing the death penalty for
juvenile offenders. 5 Evidence of this consensus was found in both the
4 Id. at 316.
5 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
6 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
7 Id. at 316.
8 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
9 Id. at 374-77.
'o Id. at 370-71.
" 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004)
(No. 03-633).
12 Id. at 399-400.
13 Id. at 412.
14 Id. at 413.
15 Id.
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increasing number of states that ban the juvenile death penalty by statute
and the infrequency with which juries now impose the punishment of death
on juvenile offenders even in jurisdictions where it is legislatively
authorized.16  On March 1, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court voted 5-4 to
affirm the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in Simmons.' 7  The Court's
decision relied on social science evidence of the reduced culpability of
juveniles and the declining use of the juvenile death penalty to ban the use
of the death penalty for persons who commit capital homicide before
reaching the age of eighteen.1
8
At the time of the Simmons decision, a growing body of research has
addressed the issues of juveniles' lesser culpability and greater risk of
wrongful execution. 19 In contrast, discussions of the declining use of the
death penalty against juveniles have been largely descriptive. This article
provides statistical analyses of the available data regarding changes in the
use of the death penalty for juveniles over time, and analyzes data on the
patterns of decisions by judges and juries to illustrate the Simmons Court's
conclusions on the consensus opposing the execution of minors.
The number of juvenile death sentences has declined sharply since
1994, when eighteen juveniles were sentenced to death.20 In 2003, only two
16 See id. at 408-10.
17 Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, 2005 WL 464890, at *18 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2005).18 ld. at *11, *'*16-17
19 See, e.g., Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCIENCE
596 (2004) (describing recent neuropsychological studies showing that development of
critical frontal lobe brain functions related to impulse control, decision making and
reasoning is incomplete at age eighteen, and may not be completed until age twenty-one or
later); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a
Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207 (2003)
(discussing evidence of juveniles' immaturity and the risk of false confessions and the risk
of error in attempts to assess individual juveniles' culpability); Elizabeth S. Scot &
Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2002) (on the diminished
culpability of adolescents owing to their deficits in psycho-social maturity, and the need for
law to accommodate these facts); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the
Extreme Youth of the Accused": The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 671-89 (2003) (on the special risk of false confessions for
adolescents).
20 See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-December 31, 2004, at 9 tbl.3, available
at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf (updated Jan. 21,
2005) [hereinafter Streib, December]; see also Victor Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty
Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes January 1, 1973-June 30, 2004,
available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathJune302004New
Tables.pdf (updated July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Streib, June]; Victor Streib, The Juvenile
Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1,
1973-April 30, 2004, available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/JuvDeathApr
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juveniles were sentenced to death, and one of these was a re-sentence
following a reversal of a previous sentence; in 2004, two juveniles were
sentenced to death.2 Adult death sentences have declined at a slower pace
during this time, from a recent peak of 320 in 1996 to 143 in 2003.22
The decline in the number of juvenile death sentences since Stanford
may simply reflect a lower juvenile homicide arrest rate and a reduced
supply of juvenile defendants eligible for death sentences. But the decline
in juvenile death sentences may also signal the emergence of a societal
norm against the imposition of capital punishment on juvenile offenders,
expressed through juries' sentencing decisions, prosecutors' decisions not
to seek death sentences for juvenile offenders, or both.23
In order to evaluate these competing explanations for the decline in
juvenile death sentences, we first conducted a descriptive analysis of trends
over time, considering both the absolute number of death sentences
imposed on juvenile offenders and the rate at which juvenile offenders are
302004.pdf (updated May 4, 2004) [hereinafter Streib, April].
21 Id. at 9 tbl.3, 21, 23. In 2004, two juveniles were sentenced to death. See id. at 9 tbl.3,
21, 23, 28. The data necessary to place these recent sentences in context, such as the
juvenile homicide arrest rate, will not be available until the end of the year. Accordingly, we
do not include these juvenile death sentences in the analyses infra.
Nevertheless, we do not anticipate that the inclusion of these two 2004 cases will alter
the trends we identify in Parts III and IV. A fluctuation of one juvenile death sentence or
even two in a single year is expected within trends of longer duration, and does not change
the statistical identification of a continuous trend of decline over time. Such fluctuations are
known in social science and financial economics as "random walks," a process consisting of
a sequence of discrete steps of fixed length and limited duration. See BARRY D. HUGHES,
RANDOM WALKS AND RANDOM ENVIRONMENTS, VoL. 1: RANDOM WALKS (1995). Random
walks follow a normal distribution, with a probability greater than 95% that the process will
return to its initial starting point or take no more than one standardized step in any direction
from its origin. See Eric W. Weisstein, Random Walk-l-Dimensional, MATHWORLD,
available at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RandomWalkl-Dimensional.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005). In a random walk, these discrete steps occur within longer statistical trends,
and do not predict the onset of an increase or decline that would alter the identification of a
continuous time trend. For example, burglary rates in the United States have declined from
110 burglaries per 1,000 households in 1973 to 27.7 in 2002. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY PROPERTY
CRIME TRENDS, 1973-2002, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/
proptrdtab.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). Within this twenty year period when burglary
rates declined more than seventy-five percent, one-year increases in the burglary rate were
measured in four of the twenty years. Id.
22 Death Penalty Information Center, Death Sentences By Year, 1973 - 2003, available at
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=873 (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The
figure for 2003 represents the projected number of death sentences for that year. Id.
23 See David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How
(Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2004). See generally
Fagan, supra note 19.
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sentenced to death (indexed to the homicide rate and to the rate at which
juveniles are arrested for homicide). We then performed a multivariate
analysis to determine whether the decline in the use of the juvenile death
penalty is statistically significant after controlling for other competing
explanations. These analyses provide an empirical foundation for
determining whether the striking decline in the use of the juvenile death
penalty reflects an emerging societal norm opposing the punishment of
death penalty for persons who committed their crimes before the age of
eighteen.
II, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EVOLVING NORMS IN THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY
Evolving norms and standards are at the heart of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has often stated that "[t]he Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society. 24 Accordingly, a punishment may be
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment if there
is a current societal consensus against the imposition of that punishment.
Indicia of evolving standards were set forth in Coker v. Georgia,25 where
the Supreme Court charted future deliberations on this question by stating
that evolving standards should be measured by "objective factors to the
maximum possible extent. ' 26 Coker and subsequent cases have relied
primarily on two objective factors to assess societal consensus with regard
to the death penalty: (1) state legislation, and (2) sentencing decisions by
juries.27 We briefly consider the first factor and then turn to the second,
which is the focus of this article.
A. STATE LEGISLATION
State legislation demonstrates that a growing number of states oppose
capital punishment for juveniles. In the fifteen years since the Stanford
decision, no state has lowered its age threshold for the juvenile death
penalty from eighteen years of age to seventeen or sixteen, although
Stanford set the lower boundary for a death sentence at sixteen.28 Instead,
during this period, six states prohibited capital punishment for juveniles by
24 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality).
2' 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
26 Id. at 592.
27 See id.; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16.
28 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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statute: Kansas (1994),29 New York (1995),3 0 Montana (1999),31 Indiana
(2002),32 South Dakota (2004),33 and Wyoming (2004).34 In addition, the
Washington Supreme Court's 1993 Furman decision interpreted
Washington's death-penalty statute as excluding the death penalty for
persons under eighteen.35 Including the eleven states that had legislatively
prohibited the juvenile death Penalty prior to the Stanford decision,
eighteen of the thirty-eight states that permit the death penalty now
expressly bar its use for offenders under the age of eighteen.36 Thirteen
jurisdictions bar the death penalty altogether. 37
Other states have passed legislative bans on the juvenile death penalty
in one or both houses of their state legislatures, a trend that the Supreme
Court noted in Atkins as states moved to ban execution of mentally retarded
defendants.38 In 2004, New Hampshire passed legislation in both houses
banning the juvenile death penalty, but the governor vetoed the legislation.
And in two of the three most active juvenile death sentencing states,39
Texas (2002) and Florida (2001, 2002, and again in 2004), one house of the
state legislature voted to ban death sentences for juveniles. These
legislative developments suggest a societal trend away from use of the
death penalty for offenders under eighteen.
B. JURY SENTENCING DECISIONS
In addition to looking at state legislation, the Supreme Court has
consistently examined data on jury sentencing decisions in order to
ascertain the existence of a societal consensus against the use of the death
penalty for a particular group.
In Coker v. Georgia,40 the Court explained:
[T]he jury... is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values
29 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (1995).
30 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (2004).
31 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2004).
32 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3 (2004).
33 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-42 (2004).
34 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (2004).
35 See State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (1993).
36 See Streib, December, supra note 20, at 7 tbl.2. The eleven states that prohibited the
juvenile death penalty prior to Stanford are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. See id.
Missouri is included in the eighteen states barring the death penalty for juveniles.
31 See id.
38 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 340, 315 (2002).
39 See infra Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 4a and 4b.
40 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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because it is so directly involved."... [I]t is thus important to look to the sentencing
decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing whether capital punishment
is an appropriate penalty for the crime being tried.
4 1
Accordingly, in support of its holding that the death penalty is an
excessive punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman,4 2 the Court
relied in part on the fact that between 1973 and 1.977, Georgia juries had
sentenced defendants to death for the crime of rape only six times.43
In Enmund v. Florida,4 the Court employed a similar analysis in
holding that death was an unconstitutional punishment under the
circumstances of that case-involving an accomplice to a robbery in which
another perpetrator shot and killed the robbery victims-for a defendant
who had neither killed nor intended to kill.45 The Court stated:
Society's rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders is
also indicated by the sentencing decisions that juries have made. As we have
previously observed, "[t]he jury ... is a significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values because it is so directly involved." The evidence is
overwhelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty
for crimes such as petitioner's.
Similarly, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,a7 a plurality of the Court relied
on evidence that, between 1982 and 1986, only five of 1861 persons under
sixteen who were arrested for homicide were sentenced to death to support
its conclusion that there was a societal consensus against the use of the
death penalty for offenders under sixteen.a And most recently, in Atkins,
the Court noted-as evidence of a national consensus against execution of
the mentally retarded-that the execution of mentally retarded offenders
was "uncommon" and that only five states had executed defendants known
to be retarded since the Court's earlier decision in Penry.
49
Consistent with the constitutional framework set out in these decisions,
this article conducts an empirical examination of the frequency with which
juries impose the death penalty on defendants who were under the age of
eighteen when they committed their crimes.
41 Id. at 596 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)).
42 See id. at 592.
43 See id. at 597.
' 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
45 See id. at 801.
46 Id. at 794 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (in turn quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181))
(citations omitted).
4' 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
48 Id. at 832-33, 833 n.39.
49 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
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C. A NOTE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
This article focuses on sentencing decisions by juries, and gauges the
rate at which juries sentence juvenile offenders to death by comparing the
number of juvenile death sentences to the number of juvenile offenders
arrested for homicide. Nevertheless, it should be noted that decisions by
prosecutors as to whether to charge a particular defendant with a capital
crime-which intervene between arrest and sentencing-will also influence
the rate at which juvenile offenders are sentenced to death.
As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence in Thompson, data on
the number of juvenile death sentences and the number of juvenile
homicide arrests, without more, "do not indicate how many juries have
been asked to impose the death penalty for crimes committed [by
juveniles], or how many times prosecutors have exercised their discretion to
refrain from seeking the death penalty in cases where the statutory
prerequisites might have been proved." 50 Justice O'Connor concluded that,
in part for that reason, the sentencing statistics on which the Thompson
plurality relied were "not dispositive," even though they did "support the
inference of a national consensus opposing the death penalty for 15-year-
olds." 5'
Although data regarding charging decisions by prosecutors would
certainly give a fuller picture of the use of the juvenile death penalty, a
statistically reliable analysis of the preferences of prosecutors across the
states that permit juvenile death sentences is probably beyond the capability
of social science. Reliable and consistent data regarding prosecutors'
decisions whether to seek the death penalty for juveniles are very hard to
obtain, if they exist at all, for three reasons: (1) uncertainty about the
existence of comprehensive written records of the reasons for case-specific
charging decisions, (2) uncertainty that prosecutors will fully open their
records to analysis, and (3) uncertainty that age-specific factors are fully
acknowledged on the record in these decisions. Accordingly, it is not
possible, given the available data, to isolate accurately the separate
influences of prosecutorial decision-making and jury decision-making on
the use of the juvenile death penalty.
We nevertheless believe that the data analyzed in this article provide
the best available empirical foundation for an analysis of societal consensus
regarding the juvenile death penalty. Although the data may reflect
prosecutors', as well as juries', choices, those actions of prosecutors are
relevant to the calculus of evolving norms. Like the actions of juries,
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prosecutors' charging decisions reflect the will of the people. They respond
to the interests of victims, as well as to the societal interest in seeking
punishments that are proportionate to the severity of the offense and that
realize retributive concerns. For that reason, the Supreme Court stated in
Enmund that "it would be relevant" to the constitutional analysis of
evolving standards "if prosecutors rarely sought the death penalty" for a
particular group of offenders, "for it would tend to indicate that prosecutors,
who represent society's interest in punishing crime, consider the death
penalty excessive" for that group of offenders.52
Moreover, as discussed further below, 53 the results of our multivariate
analysis demonstrate that the decline in the use of the juvenile death penalty
is statistically significant after controlling for the decline in the murder rate,
the decline in the juvenile homicide arrest rate, the general decline in the
use of the death penalty, and measures of political pressure and
punitiveness that correlate with use of the death penalty. Accordingly, even
if some part of the decline is due to the choices of prosecutors, the
multivariate analysis supports the conclusion that those choices were driven
by a specific societal norm against the juvenile death penalty, rather than by
other social and political factors that might affect prosecutors.
D. SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXTS: INNOCENCE AND THE DECLINE IN
JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES
The decline in juvenile death sentences since 1999 is situated in a
wider social and historical context of a "crisis of confidence" in the death
penalty in America. 54 Several challenges to the legitimacy and accuracy of
the death penalty emerged within a relatively narrow and recent timeframe
that eroded public confidence in the death penalty.55 The challenges
converged on revelations of high rates of substantive errors in the use of the
death penalty, errors that led to reversals in many cases and over 100
exonerations that in turn raised the awful specter of wrongful execution.
Accordingly, we expanded our analyses to consider whether these
challenges may have given pause to judges and juries in capital cases, and
further suppressed the rate of juvenile death sentences per juvenile
homicide arrest.
52 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982).
" See infra Part V.
54 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts
Governor's Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561 (2005).
55 See, e.g., The Gallup Organization, Question: Do Your Favor or Oppose the Death
Penalty for Persons Convicted of... Murder (Sept. 11, 1988) (78.94%); The Gallup
Organization, Question: Do Your Favor or Oppose the Death Penalty for Persons Convicted
of... Murder (June 23, 2000) (65.63%).
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The decline in the use of the death penalty for both adults and
juveniles took place in the same narrow timeframe in which these
challenges entered the nation's legal and political landscape. In this
Symposium, Professor Samuel Gross and his colleagues identify 205
exonerations for murder in the United States from 1989 through 2003,
including seventy-four for persons serving death sentences.56 Gross and his
colleagues show that the rate of exonerations averaged twelve per year from
1989-94, 57 then rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s, from thirteen in
1998 to forty-three in 2001 and forty-four in 2003.58 The trends in
exonerations mirror the trends juvenile death sentences. Juvenile death
sentences declined slowly after 1994, and then declined sharply beginning
in 1999, from fifteen in 1999 to seven in 2000 and eventually to one new
death sentence in 2003.59
The increase in exonerations through the 1990s paralleled the
recurring and dramatic revelations of innocent men on death row both in
Illinois and nationally in that decade. Illinois led the nation in total
exonerations from 1989 through 2003 with fifty-four, followed by New
York with thirty-five, Texas with twenty-eight, and California with twenty-
seven. 60  The Illinois exonerations first captured national attention in the
late 1990s. In 1996, the exonerations from death row of the "Ford Heights
56 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005) [hereinafter Gross et al., Exonerations]. The data used
in these analyses were obtained from an earlier version of this paper. Samuel Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, app. at 27-31 (Apr. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.law.umich.edu/NewsAndlnfo/exonerations-in-us.pdf (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Gross et al., Exonerations early draft]. The results reported in Section
V.B.2. infra are based on this version of the Gross et al. article, in which the authors
discussed 328 exonerations. In the Symposium publication, the authors updated their
research and modified their findings, reporting 340 exonerations. The additional twelve
cases included six murder exonerations, of which one was a capital case, and one non-capital
homicide case where the defendant was a minor. New cases were found in five death
penalty states, of which two were juvenile death penalty states. No states added cases that
had no exonerations in the previous version. Accordingly, these small differences will not
statistically alter the pattern of results reported in Table 15 infra.
57 Gross et al., Exonerations, supra note 56, at 4 fig. 1.
58 Id. at 4 fig.1 & 3 n.10. Although the discovery of exculpatory DNA evidence
accounted for fewer than half of the 340 exonerations reported by Gross and colleagues,
DNA became linked in the popular imagination to the question of innocence. See BRIAN
FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES, 201-04 (2004). See generally
JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT
RIGHT (2003).
59 New juvenile death sentences are distinguished from juveniles re-sentenced to death
following appellate review and reversal. See infra Part III.B.
60 Gross et al., Exonerations, supra note 56, at 17 tbl.2.
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Four" grabbed national headlines. 61 The Chicago Tribune's 1999 series
"The failure of the death penalty in Illinois"62 concluded that the recurring
problem of exonerations in capital cases was intrinsic to capital prosecution
in the state. Later in 1999, the exoneration of Anthony Porter within forty-
eight hours of his scheduled execution dramatically highlighted the urgency
of these exonerations and the risks of error. 63 By January 2003, when then-
Governor George H. Ryan commuted the sentences of Illinois's death row
and placed a moratorium on the death penalty in the state, seventeen of the
289 persons sentenced to death in Illinois had already been exonerated by
appellate review, an error rate of 5.9%. 64
The Illinois revelations were followed closely by the release in June
2000 of a study by Professor James Liebman and colleagues at Columbia
University showing that two in three death sentences from 1973 through
1995 were reversed at one or more stages or appellate review. The study
was widely reported in the national media,66 and was cited in several state
61 See Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How it Happened, What it Promises,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2005). See generally DAVID L. PROTESS & ROBERT
WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE (1998) (documenting the media reactions to the
exonerations of the four death row inmates).
62 Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois (series),
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14-18, 1999, at 1.
63 Andrew Bluth, Illinois Man Is Finally Cleared in 2 Murders: An Armed Robbery
Conviction Lingers from a Murder Case., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1990, at A20; Sharon Cohen,
Last-Minute Exonerations Fuel Death-Penalty Debate Justice: Wrongful Convictions Shift
Focus from Morality to Legitimacy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999, at Al; Daniel H. Lehmann,
Cleared of '82 Murders, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at 8.
64 Warden, supra note 61.
65 James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973 - 1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839 (2000) [hereinafter
Liebman et al., Capital Attrition] (showing that 68% of all death sentences since Furman v.
Georgia were reversed either on direct appeal, state direct appeal, or federal habeas review;
most (82%) of those reversed were re-sentenced to non-capital punishments, 7% were
exonerated, and the remainder were re-sentenced to death); see also FORST, supra note 58, at
200-02 (noting that the errors in these cases were the result of misidentification of
witnesses, prosecutorial or police misconduct, incompetent defense counsel, prejudicial
instructions by judges, and biased jury selection procedures); James Liebman, Jeffrey
Fagan, & Valerie West, A Broken System, Part I: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995
(2000), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/
[hereinafter Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part 1]; James Liebman et al., A Broken
System, Part H: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done
About It (2002), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf
[hereinafter Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II].
66 See, e.g., David Broder, Broken Justice, WASH. POST, June 19, 2000, at B.07:
In the annals of politics, there have been few pieces of social research which have decisively
affected the course of policy debate. Michael Harrington's "The Other America" opened the eyes
of the nation-and of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson-to the extent of poverty in this nation.
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commissions that have examined substantive problems in the administration
of the death penalty.67 The discovery of widespread unreliability in death
sentences ignited arguments that the "reasonable doubt" standard of proof
in capital cases should be replaced by a "beyond any doubt" standard.68
Daniel Patrick Moynihan's essay on "The Negro Family" alerted President Nixon and his
successors to the plight of female-headed welfare families.
Now, there may be a third. James S. Liebman's just-published report, "A Broken System: Error
Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995," transforms the debate on the death penalty as much as those
earlier works did the understanding of poverty and welfare in America.
Id.; see also Jonathan Alter, The Death Penalty on Trial: Special Report-DNA and Other
Evidence Freed 87 People From Death Row; Now Ricky McGinn is Roiling Campaign
2000; Why America's Rethinking Capital Punishment, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 24, 26-
34 (noting changes in political rhetoric concerning the death penalty); Alan Berlow, The
Broken Machinery of Death, THE AM. PROSPECT, July 30, 2001, at 16; David Gergen, Death
by Incompetence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 26, 2000, at 76; James Liebman, The
Condemned, and The Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2000 at A20; Murder One, THE
ECONOMIST, June 17, 2000, at 33:
America has been convulsed by a debate about the death penalty.... Most of the arguments
have either been ideological or framed in terms of emotive individual cases .... Hence the
importance, this week, of the first real data. It comes from the first comprehensive study of all
the 5,760 capital cases heard in America from 1973 to 1995.
Id. This research was cited as a model for contemporary scholarship of relevance to the
legal profession and to the reform of legal institutions by the President of the American
Association of Law Schools in the Association's quarterly publication. See Elliott Milstein,
Coming Soon to A Law School Near You: A Colloquium on How You Can Help Promote
Access to Equal Justice, THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS NEWSL. (Washington, D.C.), Aug.
2000, at 1, available at http://www.aals.org/pmaug00.html.
See also David Broder, A Broken System, WASH. POST, June 18, 2000, at B7
(Editorial); Fox Butterfield, Death Sentences Being Overturned in 2 of 3 Appeals, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2000, at Al; Deadly Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2000, at A26
(Editorial); David Gergen, Death by Incompetence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 26,
2000, at 76; Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty Overturned in Most Cases, L.A. TIMES, June
12, 2000, at Al; Good Morning America: Study Finds U.S. Capital Punishment System
Flawed (ABC News broadcast, June 12, 2000); The Early Show: New Study of the Death
Penalty Finds that a Majority of the Cases are Overturned on Appeal (CBS News broadcast,
June 12, 2000); Today: Professor James Liebman, Columbia University, Discusses Death
Penalty (NBC broadcast, June 12, 2000); Morning Edition: Recent Study Showing High
Number of Death Penalty Cases Have Been Reversed Because of Critical Mistakes (NPR
broadcast, June 12, 2000); All Things Considered: Studies Show the Death Penalty System is
Fraught with Error (NPR broadcast, June 12, 2000); The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Death
Penalty Debate (PBS broadcast, June, 13, 2000).
67 State death penalty study commissions in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have
cited the Columbia study as one impetus to examine the state's system of capital
punishment. For discussion and links to each of the state study commission reports, see
Human Rights Watch, The Death Penalty in the United States of America, at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/deathpenalty/statestudies.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
68 FORST, supra note 58; Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II, supra note 65.
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Coming closely on the heels of the revelations of actual innocence and the
exonerations of inmates on death row in Illinois, and in the shadow of the
growing number of exonerations nationally that surpassed 100 in 2002, the
Liebman et al. study intensified the debate on the accuracy of the death
penalty and further raised doubts about the reliability of capital sentences.
Many of the issues in capital punishment revealed by the exonerations
in Illinois and elsewhere, and by the Liebman et al. study, have particular
salience for adolescents facing the death penalty, and may underlie the
declining use of the death penalty for adolescents who are convicted of
capital murders committed before the age of eighteen. Juveniles accounted
for thirty-three of the 340 exonerations reported by Professor Gross and
colleagues, including twenty-three for murder. Fourteen of the thirty-three
were exonerated following revelation of false confessions, a far higher rate
(42%) compared to their older counterparts (13%).69 The special
vulnerability of adolelcents to false confessions reflects their
developmental and functional immaturity and the likelihood of their
diminished culpability. 0
The tension between the culpability and immaturity of juvenile
murderers was highlighted in recent cases in Florida involving Lionel Tate,
and in Michigan involving Nathaniel Abraham.71 In each case, public
69 Gross et al., Exonerations, supra note 56, at 545.
70 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in a Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 892, 963 (2004); see, e.g., Beckman, supra note 19 (describing
recent neuropsychological studies showing that development of critical frontal lobe brain
functions related to impulse control, decision making and reasoning is incomplete at age
eighteen, and may not be completed until age twenty-one or later); Fagan, supra note 19
(discussing evidence of juveniles' immaturity and the risk of false confessions, and the risk
of error in attempts to assess individual juveniles' culpability); Scott & Steinberg, supra note
19 (on the diminished culpability of adolescents owing to their deficits in psycho-social
maturity, and the need for law to accommodate these facts); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note
19, at 671-89 (on the special risk of false confessions for adolescents). Questions about the
diminished culpability of juveniles reached the U.S. Supreme Court in a rare published
dissent by Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg in August 2002, in a petition for certiorari
in a juvenile death penalty case that was denied. See Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984
(2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J., dissenting); see also Adam Liptak, 3 Justices Call
for Reviewing Death Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 2002 at Al.
71 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Michigan Boy Who Killed at 11 is Convicted of Murder as
Adult, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al; Michael Browning, Boy, 14, Gets Life in TV
Wrestling Death: Killing of 6-Yr. -Old Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay, Florida Judge Says,
CHi. SuN-TmEs, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1 (noting that the death occurred while Tate was
"allegedly demonstrating wrestling techniques on her"); Dana Canedy, At 14, a Life
Sentence: Boy Killed Girl in 'Wrestling' Murder, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001, at
IA. The case of thirteen-year-old Nathaniel serves as another example of the tendency on
the part of prosecutors to respond to the deeds rather than the needs of juvenile defendants.
Despite the fact that Nathaniel "was officially assessed as functioning at the level of a six-
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debates about the severity of their crimes were contextualized in analyses of
their immaturity and the belief of the courts that these juveniles were
amenable to change. Whether this contextualist view of culpability enters
the deliberations of jurors, whether simply to rule out death or to more
cautiously calibrate the reliability of a conviction when the defendant is an
adolescent, the special considerations of the culpability of adolescents and
the heightened risks of error may be factors that contribute to the recent
decline in juvenile death sentences. The Atkins majority worried about the
potential for execution of innocents, or at the least, of those less culpable.72
The same may now be true about jurors in juvenile death penalty cases.
Accordingly, we extend the analyses in this article to examine whether
the accumulation of innocence has influenced the rate of juvenile death
sentences. We include measures of exonerations in multivariate models to
estimate the contributions of innocence to the declining patterns of juvenile
death sentences and evidence of the evolving social and legal norms on the
juvenile death penalty.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
A. OVERVIEW
To test for evidence of an evolving standard in the use of the juvenile
death penalty since 1989, when the Supreme Court last addressed the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in Stanford, we examined
trends and patterns in the use of the death penalty for juvenile offenders
during the period from 1990-the year following the Stanford decision-to
2003.
In order to understand the significance of changes in the frequency
year-old, both intellectually and emotionally," prosecutors, pursuant to a state statute, Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. 712A.2d (West 2000), charged him as an adult for first degree murder on
the basis that he was capable of forming the requisite intent. Deanna M. Maher, Michigan
Juveniles Are Denied Equal Defenses Before the Law: The State of Michigan's Reaction to
Juvenile Defendants, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 259, 260 (2001). At thirteen years of age,
Nathaniel was the youngest person to be tried for first degree murder in the United States.
Christina DeJong & Eve Schwitzer Merrill, Getting "Tough on Crime": Juvenile Waiver
and the Court, 27 OHio N.U. L. REv. 175, 175 (2001). Although Nathaniel was eventually
found guilty by a Detroit jury of second degree murder, the judge presiding over the case
exercised the discretion allotted to him under Michigan law to sentence Nathaniel to a
juvenile detention center rather than a prison. Maher, supra, at 261. The judge was able to
exercise this discretion because Nathaniel was under the age of fourteen when he committed
the alleged offense. For an analysis of how trial court judges adjusted the sentences of these
defendants to accommodate their immaturity and prospects for rehabilitation, see Fagan,
supra note 19.
72 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 n.25 (2002).
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with which the death penalty is imposed on juvenile offenders, it is
necessary to take account of the decline in the homicide rate and, in
particular, in the juvenile homicide rate, beginning in the 1990s. As Figure
l a shows, the homicide rate in the United States peaked in 1991 and has
declined steadily since 1993. 73 As Figure lb shows, an even steeper decline
has occurred during the same period for juvenile homicides; the rate for
homicides committed by juveniles ages fourteen to seventeen peaked in
1993 and has declined steadily since that year.74 Any estimate of the
magnitude of the decline in juvenile death sentencing since 1990 must
therefore account for the general decline in the supply of defendants-both
juveniles and adults-who were eligible for the death penalty. Only trends
that are independent of changing homicide rates would reflect an evolving
standard in death sentencing. Accordingly, we examine data from 1990
through 2003 to determine whether there has been a decline in the number
of death sentences imposed on juvenile offenders that is not explained by
the decline in the juvenile homicide rate.
73 See also Alfred Blumstein, Disaggregating the Violence Trends, in THE CRIME DROP
IN AMERICA 13, 20-24 (A. Blumstein & J. Wallman eds., 2000). The homicide rate per
100,000 persons has followed a cyclical pattern over the past thirty years, with peaks in 1974
(9.8), 1980 (10.2) and 1991 (9.8), followed in each instance by declines of varying durations.
See JAMES ALLEN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/homtrnd.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005). In addition to reaching a record high nationally in 1991, the
homicide rate reached record levels in fourteen of the largest 100 cities in the United States
in that year. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997).
74 See also, e.g., Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in
Youth Violence, 29 CRIME AND JUST. 1 (2002).
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Figure Ia. Homicide Victimization Rates per 100,000











1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Source: FBI, SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS, 1976-2002
Figure lb. Homicide Offending Rates per 100,000
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The research design is a simple cross-sectional prospective analysis of
patterns and trends at the state level for each year beginning in 1990. We
include as observations for each state only the years in the study interval
when there was a valid juvenile death sentencing statute in effect.75
Following a set of descriptive analyses, we report the results of a series
of multivariate statistical models that test whether the rate of decline in
juvenile death sentences is simply an artifact of the decline in homicides by
juvenile offenders since 1993 or is a trend indicative of changes in social
and legal norms. To evaluate these competing claims, we analyzed the rate
of decline in the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders
relative to homicide arrest rates for juveniles. We also distinguished trends
in the juvenile death penalty from broader social trends in the use of capital
punishment for adults. That is, we compared the decline in death sentences
per homicide for juveniles to the rate at which death sentences were
imposed on young adult defendants-ages eighteen to twenty-four-to
show that the decline in the use of the death penalty is specific to juveniles.
A rate of decline in the number of juvenile death sentences that is greater
than the rate of decline in juvenile homicide arrests, and greater than
comparable declines for adult death sentences is evidence of changing
social and legal norms. Accordingly, these analyses test whether there is a
statistical trend that signifies growing rejection of the use of the death
penalty for minors.
B. DEATH SENTENCES AND PERSONS SENTENCED TO DEATH
Throughout this article, we distinguish between death sentences for
juveniles and juveniles sentenced to death. These counts vary slightly, as
we show in Table 4. For example, one juvenile in 2002 and another in
2003 were re-sentenced to death following reversals of earlier death
sentences. There are valid reasons to examine each of these dimensions of
the juvenile death penalty, and we do so whenever possible in the
descriptive analyses. However, in the multivariate analyses predicting the
use of the death penalty and its rate of decline, we use only new sentences,
or persons (juveniles and adults) sentenced to death.
We do this for three reasons. First, death sentences imposed post-
appeal are not independent of the initial death sentence. This presents a
host of well-known statistical problems, particularly concerning tests of
significance for non-independent observations. 76 Second, death sentences
75 For example, the Washington Supreme Court construed the state's death penalty
statute as not applying to juvenile offenders in 1993. Accordingly, for Washington, we
include only four years of observations.
76 See generally MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (2d
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issued post-appeal reflect dynamics that are influenced by both the appeals
process and the initial sentencing process. The relative contributions of
each of these legal dynamics to a subsequent re-sentence are unclear and
perhaps unknowable. To be re-sentenced to death, a defendant must have
been initially sentenced, had that sentence overturned upon review at some
point later in time (often, years later), and then, been re-sentenced to death
following a new trial. Time to review and outcomes at review vary widely
across sentencing jurisdictions, and these differences in review periods
further complicate comparisons of cases and causes of death sentences.77
Third, not all death sentences that are overturned upon review are sent back
for a new sentence; only a small fraction result in a new death sentence. 78 It
is unknown exactly what factors govern the outcome of cases post appeals,
but it would be foolish to assume that they are identical to those which
influence the initial sentencing process.
C. DATA SOURCES
We constructed a database on state trends in death sentences for
juveniles and adults. We then integrated data on state trends in crime and
punishment, and included indices of social, economic and political trends
that are correlated with death sentences, crime, and the behavior of criminal
justice agencies. The database includes all death sentences from 1990 to
2003; no sampling was used or needed. The data used here are
administrative data, collected from official data sources, including the U.S.
Census, the Bureau of Justice Statistics' database on capital punishment, 79
and the Uniform Crime Reports 80 maintained by the U.S. Department of
Justice to provide a crime-recording and accounting system. We also used
the comprehensive index of juvenile death sentences maintained by
Professor Victor Streib, which is widely used in the analysis of the juvenile
death penalty. 81 Table 1 provides an overview of data domains and sources.
ed. 2001).
77 See Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II, supra note 65.
78 See id.
79 See TRACEY SNELL & THOMAS J. BONZCAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 2002 (2003), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bis/abstract/cpO2.htm. Data are
publicly available at National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan, at www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/archive.prl?study=3958
(last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
80 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, various years, at www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (last
visited May 12, 2004). Data are publicly available at National Archive of Criminal Justice
Data, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
81 Streib, December, supra note 20, at 5.
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Table 2 shows the variables computed from these data that were used in the
analyses in Sections IV and V.
Table 1

















The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes January 1, 1973-June 30, 2004,
available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/
JuvDeathJune302004NewTables.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
This is a website maintained by Professor Victor Streib for
nearly two decades with a comprehensive list of juveniles who
have received death sentences and their dispositions.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973-2002
(ICPSR STUDY 3958). Compiled by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. First ICPSR Edition April
2004, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu (last visited Jan.
11, 2005). 2
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service, National Center for Health Statistics, Compressed
Mortality Files. State homicide and victimization data,
including by race, are from the Vital Statistics of the United
States or other data compilations generated by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Health
Statistics. Data for 1988-1992 are from Vital Statistics of the
United States, Mortality Detail Files, 1968-1992 (ICPSR
STUDY 7632, 6798). Data for 1993-1998 are from Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Health
Statistics, Compressed Mortality File, 1989-98 CD-ROM Series
20, No 2C ASCII Version. Data after 1998 are from CDC
Wonder, the Centers for Disease Control data extraction engine
at http://wonder.cdc.gov (last visited Jan 11, 2005). 3
Annual homicide arrests are taken from The Uniform Crime
Reporting Program Data [United States]: Supplementary
Homicide Reports 1976-2001 (ICPSR Study #s, 3108, 3448, and
3722). Additional arrest data was taken from The Sourcebook
of Criminal Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1988-
2002. Juvenile and adult homicide arrests are based on the
greater value of these two data sources. Due to non-reporting
issues and difference in age categories used in these two data
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sources, counts of juvenile homicide arrests include all arrests
of persons under the age of eighteen. Adult homicides arrests
are for all ages over seventeen.4
Punishment Data are taken from an annual series of reports and data on state
Trends and federal prison populations from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics. Annual state prison population data are taken from
the National Corrections Reporting Program. Data are from
electronic spreadsheets available from Bureau of Justice
Statistics Spreadsheets- Crime & Justice Electronic Data,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ dtdata.htm#prisoners
(last visited Jan 11, 2005). Data from 1999-2001 are taken from
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook
of Criminal Justice Statistics.
Drug Arrests Crime data are from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform
Crime Reports for the United States: Crime in the United States,
1973-2001.6
Social and Population, Poverty, and Urbanization Data. State population,
Economic socio-economic and racial composition data are from the United
Character- States Census Bureau Data. Population totals and racial
istics composition are taken from Estimates by Age, Sex, and Race;
Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race and
Hispanic Origin: 1981 to 1989. For 1990 to 2000, Summary
Tape File 3C (STF3C) population totals and racial composition
are the linear interpolation of the 1990 and 2000 values. For
2001, total population and racial composition are from Census
Bureau estimates, available at http://eire.census.gov/popest/
data/states (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
Age Structure and Urbanization. The age structure and
percentage of the population in urban areas for each state were
taken from the United States Census Bureau's Census of the
Population 1990 and 2000, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Jan 11, 2005). Years
between census years were linearly interpolated and the values
for the age structure in 1988 and 1989 were set at the 1990
values. For 1988 and 1989, the percentage of the population in
urban areas was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the
United States.
Poverty. The percentage of each state's population below the
poverty line was taken from the Census Bureau's annual
poverty estimates, available at http://factfinder.census.gov (last
visited Jan. 11, 2005).
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Additional data were collected from previous research, and data
supplied from other published research projects.7
Political Indices of the political pressure on state trial court and appellate
Contexts judges from judicial selection techniques were developed by
Liebman et al.8 based on provisions of each state's Constitutions
and codes governing judicial selection for trial court judges,
supplemented by information from the National Center for State
Courts. 9
Innocence Counts of the number of exonerations by state and year were
Cases computed from data compiled by Samuel Gross et al.,
Exonerations early draft, supra note 56, at app. at 27-31.
Streib, June, supra note 20, at 5; see also Strieb, December and April, supra note 20.
2 THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
2002 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cp02.htm. Data and codebooks are
available at National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, Inter-University Consortium for Social and
Political Research, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archivestudy-3958.
3 Through 1992, the relevant data sources list homicide victims by state of death. After 1993, the
relevant data source lists homicide victims by state of residence. Data for 2001 exclude all victims
from the events of September 11 th.
4 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM
DATA [UNITED STATES]: SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS 1976-2001 (ICPSR Study 3108,
3448, and 3722); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1988-2002 (2002). Data for Kansas were largely missing and are
taken from Kansa Bureau of Investigation and are available at http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi (last
visited Jan. 11, 2005); Florida data were also missing and are taken from the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement publications available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
5 See, e.g., PAIGE HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2002 (2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p02.pdf.
6 Drug arrests for Florida are from unpublished data provided by the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement. Missing data from other states were linearly interpolated.
'See, e.g., H. Naci Mocan & R. Kay Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, XLVI J.L. ECON. 453 (2003). Professor Mocan graciously
provided his data, including economic and population characteristics and measures of punishment
and other criminal justice case processing indicia.
8 See Liebman et al., Broken System, Part I, supra note 65; Liebman et al., Broken System, Part II,
supra note 65.
9 See C. Flango & D. Rottman, Appellate Court Procedures (Nat'l Center for State Courts, 1998); D.
Rottman & C. Flango, State Court Organization 1998 (Nat'l Center for State Courts, 2000);
American Bar Association, Standards on State Judicial Selection 2000 (ABA Standing Committee
on Judicial Indevendence, Commission on State Judicial Selection, 2001).




























Counts of persons under the age of eighteen
sentenced to death by state and year.
The fourteen years in the study period taken as a
linear trend from the beginning to the end of the
study.
A quadratic term for time; time is squared.
All years greater than 1999 are coded as 1, and all
years 1999 and before are coded as zero.
The interaction of Year Greater than 1990 with
Time.
The interaction of Year Greater than 1990 with
Time Squared.
The natural log of the number of murders in a state
and year per 100,000 state residents in the state and
year.
The natural log of the population that is under the
age of eighteen.
The natural log of the population that is age fifteen
and above in each state year.
The percentage of the population in a given state
and year that is under age twenty-five.
The state's Black homicide victims per 100,000
Black population divided by its rate of White
homicide victims per 100,000 White population.
Percentage of the state's population that is Black.
Percentage of the state's population in urban areas
as defined by the United States Census Bureau.
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The percentage of the state's population below the
poverty line.
A measure of the extent to which a state's trial
court judges are subject to political repercussions
based on their judicial performance through
political or electoral politics. The index combines
the way in which judges are selected, the way they
are retained, and the length of the first term.2
The ratio of the number of inmates incarcerated in
prison in the state per 100 Index FBI Crimes
reported in the state in that year.
The number of persons under the age of eighteen
arrested for homicide in a state year.
The un-standardized residual for each state year of
the homicide rate regressed on a vector of
predictors. For each year starting in 1988 the
homicide rate was regressed, using ordinary least
squares, on the percentage of the population under
twenty-five, the percentage of the population that is
Black, the percentage of the population in urban
areas, the percentage of the population below
poverty, the number of drug arrests, and the natural
log of the population age fifteen and above.2
The number of exonerations in each state-year.
The two- and three-year averages of exonerations
in each state.
The two- and three-year averages of exonerations
nationally.
All predictors were lagged by two years.
2 For a fuller discussion of this variable, see Liebman et al., Broken System, Part I, supra note 65;
Liebman et al., Broken System, Part II, supra note 65.
Model statistics available from authors.
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D. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
1. Descriptive Analyses
We first report results of descriptive analyses showing patterns and
trends in death sentencing for juveniles and adults. We computed both
absolute numbers of death sentences and the rate at which juveniles are
sentenced to death, expressed as number of death sentences per 100
juvenile homicide arrests. 82  Because juvenile death sentences since
Stanford are concentrated in a small number of states-Texas, Florida, and
Alabama account for more than half of the juvenile death sentences
imposed from 1990 to 2003 83-we also analyze state-specific figures to
identify trends in these three states that disproportionately contribute the
largest share of juvenile death sentences.
2. Multivariate Tests
To determine whether there is a statistically significant downward
trend in juvenile death sentencing, we estimate models of the number of
juvenile death sentences using zero-inflated Poisson regression models.
Poisson techniques are appropriate to identify factors that predict the
number of occurrences of an event within a specific observation period.84
The Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution which takes on the values
y = 0, 1, 2, 3,.... It is often used as a model for the number of events
(such as the number of telephone calls at a business or the number of
accidents at an intersection) in a specific time period. It is useful in studies
of law and crime to model the number of crimes or the number of prison
sentences. The probability distribution for a Poisson process is defined as:
p (y yi) A= e( )Ai= ~)-e ,2~ y = 0,1,2,3,..
where
E[yi= 2i = eox,
The exact distribution depends on the expected rate of occurrence of
the event of interest (X), and X is a vector of explanatory variables. When X
is low, the distribution is skewed to the left. When X is high, the
82 To account for the lag between homicide arrests and death sentences, we lagged
homicide arrests by two years.
83 See Streib, December, supra note 20, at 5.
84 See, e.g., WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 2000); PETER KENNEDY,
A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS (1995).
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distribution more closely resembles a normal distribution.
Poisson distributions typically assume that events are inevitable, and
that they follow some known distribution or frequency pattern. In most
circumstances, there are very few non-occurrences, even though most
events occur infrequently, and there are a small number of observations that
have higher counts of events. So, for example, very few children miss no
days during the school year, most children are absent from school only a
few days a year, a small number of children are absent regularly (perhaps
once a month), and an even smaller number are frequently absent. But
suppose we are observing a particularly healthy group of children, and
school absence is rare. The event (school absence) is not inevitable, and we
need to know, first, who is absent at least once, and among those, who is
absent more or less often. That is, the few who miss any school at all are
absent at varying rates, most of them quite rarely but a few more often.
These two distributions of absence would require two different processes or
models to account for the high number of zeros and the relatively infrequent
occurrence of school absence.
Accordingly, the Poisson distribution may not accurately predict the
occurrence of a discrete event when these events are rare within an
observational period. That is, the Poisson model may be inaccurate if there
is a separate process that seems to be influencing not just the frequency of
an event, but whether the event itself occurs at any rate greater than zero.85
In other words, there may be two data generating processes that produce the
observed distribution: one which generates a non-zero observation, and a
second that generates a count of non-zero events.
We face that situation in this study: there are 264 state-years with no
juvenile death sentences, out of a total of 334 observations. The number of
juvenile death sentences might be zero either because there are too few
homicide arrests to produce an eligible pool of defendants, or the
jurisdiction simply may choose not to use this sentencing option, regardless
of the characteristics of the pool of juvenile homicide defendants or the
85 This situation is especially problematic when the non-zero events themselves are
highly skewed. The risks of unreliable predictions with highly skewed data, including both
predictors and outcomes, are well-known and thoroughly discussed in many statistics texts.
The skewed non-zero observations have strong leverage over the data. Efforts to model these
results to fit these unusual distributions tend to result in a domination of the data by these
extreme cases, and they will unduly influence the results. Leverage turns into influence
when the extreme values of one variable are paired with extremes of the response variable
(in this case, juvenile homicide arrests and juvenile death sentences). The results usually
then reflect the few anomalous cases, not the majority of the observations. See, e.g., D.R.
COOK & SANFORD WEISBERG, APPLIED REGRESSION, INCLUDING COMPUTING AND GRAPHICS
(1999); Christopher J. Zorn, An Analytic and Empirical Examination of Zero-Inflated and
Hurdle Poisson Specifications, 26 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS AND RESEARCH 368 (1998).
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characteristics of the crimes they committed. In either case, this is a
separate phenomenon from a process that generates a count of events once
the decision is made to use the process. In a distribution with so many
zeros, once the hurdle is crossed so that a non-zero count is generated, the
rate of occurrence of the events of interest, such as juvenile death sentences,
are likely to be quite low.
This is the rationale for two forms of Poisson regression: Poisson
models, which model the factors that predict the event being observed, and
Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) models, 86 which also model these predictors
but accommodate distributions with a large number of zero observations.
87
Both model forms treat each observation as an independent event and
estimate regression models that predict the count of these events from a
known set of potential explanatory factors. But they differ in one critical
statistical respect: in contrast to a Poisson model, the ZIP model combines
equations that reflect the "dual regime" data-generating processes: one that
generates the count of non-zero events, and a second that produces the
observed distributions. 88
In a Zero-Inflated Poisson model, the hurdle from a zero to a non-zero
count is modeled separately as a binary outcome, and then introduced into
the second stage specification of the non-zero event counts. The final
model is an exponential function of (possibly different) explanatory
variables. The contributions of potential explanatory variables are tested in
both components of the model, as:
p(yi = 0) = pi + (1- pi)e
p(yi = y)= p(1- pi)e(-i)1 y
One question remains: what is the threshold of overdispersion, or how
many zero-observations would compel an analyst to abandon a Poisson
regression model and use a ZIP model? To test the appropriateness of
using a ZIP model rather than a traditional Poisson model, Professor Quang
H. Vuong proposed a test statistic that is well suited for situations where the
86 GREENE, supra note 84, at 22; Diane Lambert, Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression, with
an Application to Defects in Manufacturing, 343 TECHNOMETRIcS 1 (1992).
87 See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 84, at 22; JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL AND PANEL DATA (2003); Zorn, supra note 85, at 369-70.
88 See generally Zorn, supra note 85.
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distributions (Poisson, in this case) can be anticipated. 9 Vuong's statistic is
V = Vn -m / sm, where m, is the log of the ratio of the predi~ted probabilities
from the extended model and the Poisson model log ( Pe /P)i The limiting
distribution of V is a standard normal distribution. Large positive values
favor the extended model (the ZIP model), and large negative values
favoring the Poisson or nonzero-inflated version of the model. 90 Values
close to zero in absolute value favor neither model. 91
In the analyses in Section V, we estimate models using both model
forms. In the first stage, we estimated ZIP models, and included the Vuong
test. The results were inconclusive, i.e., not statistically significant, but not
zero either. Accordingly, we used both the ZIP model and the more
conservative "hurdle" Poisson specification.92
Whenever these models are used, robustness checks are essential to
check for the stability of predictors under different model specification
conditions that challenge assumptions about the causes in the skewness of
the dependent variable in the face of skewed predictors. We include such
checks by varying the predictor (explanatory) variable sets to use data from
several sources and, more importantly, with different distributional
properties. 9'
IV. TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES
Table 3 shows the current lineup of states by age of eligibility for
capital sentencing for juvenile offenders; it also shows the states that
imposed at least one juvenile death sentence at any time during the study
period. Several states, such as Utah and Delaware, had valid statutes but
their courts did not impose any juvenile death sentences from 1990-2003.
A. TRENDS BY TIME ACROSS STATES
Juvenile death sentences have been rare events since 1990. We
counted juveniles sentenced to death (excluding re-sentencings) in each
year in each state while that state had a valid juvenile death sentence
statute. There were 262 state-year observations with no juveniles sentenced
to death. When states did sentence juveniles to death, most sentenced only
89 See Quang H. Vuong, Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested
Hypotheses, 57 ECONOMETRICA 307 (1989).
90 See J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES (1997).
9' See id.
92 See Yin Bin Cheung, Zero-Inflated Models for Regression Analysis of Count Data: A
Study of Growth and Development, 21 STAT. IN MED. 1461, 1462-67 (2002).
93 See Zorn, supra note 85.
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one juvenile to death in a year (fifty-two); and rarely were there more than
two. Although death sentences were more frequent for persons ages
eighteen to twenty-four, there were no persons in that age group sentenced
to death in 120 of the state-year data points. However, some states
frequently used the death penalty for this group: there were eighteen state-
years with more than ten persons ages eighteen to twenty-four sentenced to
death.
Table 3
Capital Sentencing History and Age Eligibility by State 1990-2003
Minimum Age Eligible for Capital Sentencing 2003
Active Juvenile
States 1990- Sixteen Seventeen Eighteen
2003
Alabama Alabama Florida California
Arizona Arkansas Georgia Colorado
Arkansas Arizona New Hampshire Connecticut
Florida Delaware North Carolina Federal System





North Carolina Oklahoma Montana*
Nevada Pennsylvania Nebraska
Oklahoma South Carolina New Jersey
Pennsylvania Utah New Mexico







Data Sources: Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003); American Bar Assoc., Juvenile Death
Penalty Resources & Information, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources.html#context;
Streib, June, supra note 20.
* The minimum age was raised to eighteen in South Dakota and Wyoming in 2004; Indiana in 2002;
Missouri in 2003; Montana in 1999; and Washington in 1993.
Table 4 shows that a total of 112 juvenile defendants received death
sentences from 1990-2003. These totals exclude persons who were re-
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sentenced to death following reversals of earlier convictions and death
sentences. Table 4 shows that fifty-seven young persons were sentenced to
death in states with a minimum age of sixteen, and fifty-five were
sentenced to death in states with a minimum age of seventeen. The peak
year for juveniles sentenced to death was 1994, when fifteen juvenile
offenders were newly sentenced to death. Following a more recent peak of
fourteen juvenile offenders sentenced to death in 1999, the number of
juvenile offenders sentenced to death has declined each year. In 2000, the
number of persons receiving juvenile death sentences dropped sharply to
seven, a decline of 50%. The number declined again to three in 2002, and
one in 2003. Table 4 also shows that the number of juvenile death
sentences, as distinguished from the number of persons sentenced to death
followed a similar trend during this period.
Table 4. Juvenile Death Sentences and Juveniles Sentenced to Death
by Year in States with Capital Punishment for Juveniles, by Minimum
Age of Eligibility*, 1990-2003




































































Source: Streib, June, supra note 20.
* Data include first death sentences that originated during the study period. Data include death
sentences for two defendants fifteen years of age, the first in 1990 in Alabama, the second in 1991 in
Florida. The current minimum death penalty age is seventeen in Florida and sixteen in Alabama.
- v
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The rate of decline in the number of juveniles sentenced to death is
greater than the decline in the number of adults sentenced to death, both
those in the next closest demographic group-ages eighteen to twenty-
four-and persons age twenty-five and older. Table 5 compares the
number of persons sentenced to death in each of these three age groups
from 1990 to 2002. 94 For example, the number of juveniles sentenced to
death declined from fourteen in 1999 to three in 2002, a drop of 79%. In
the eighteen to twenty-four age bracket, the number of persons sentenced to
death declined from eighty-nine to forty-three in the same time period, a
decline of 52%; among persons twenty-five and older, the number of
persons sentenced to death declined from 161 to 97 during this period, a
drop of 40%.
Table 5
Total Persons Sentenced to Death by Year and Age in Juvenile Death
Penalty States, 1990-2002
Year Under 18 18-24 25 and Over Total
1990 8 69 178 255
1991 5 91 168 264
1992 6 98 164 268
1993 6 112 154 272
1994 15 121 163 299
1995 12 122 164 298
1996 12 109 177 298
1997 8 100 155 263
1998 10 112 166 288
1999 14 89 161 264
2000 7 69 146 222
2001 5 55 99 159
2002 3 43 97 143
Total 111 1,190 1,992 3,293
Sources: SNELL & BONZCAR, supra note 79; Streib, December, supra note 20.
Another way to gauge the decline is to examine the drop from the peak
rate during the study period. The number of juveniles sentenced to death
declined from the peak yearly incidence of fifteen (in 1994) to three (in
94 Table 5 excludes juveniles sentenced to death in 2003, since comparable data are not
available for adults during that year.
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2002), a decline of 82%. For persons ages eighteen to twenty-four, the
number of persons sentenced to death declined from a peak incidence of
122 (in 1995) to 43 (in 2002), a decline of 65%. For persons twenty-five
and older, the number of persons sentenced to death has increased and
declined cyclically during the study period, declining from a peak of 178
(in 1990) to 154 (in 1993), increasing again to 177 (in 1996), and then
declining again to 97 (in 2002). The total decrease from the peak of 178 in
1990 to the low of 97 in 2002 is 45.5%. Thus, considering either of these
two age categories, the rate of decline in the number of juveniles sentenced
to death is far greater than the rate for older murder defendants.
Fgure 2a. Death Sentences By Year and Age, States with the
Death Penalty for Juveniles, 1990-2003
-$-Tota Juvenile Death Sentences
IOD .,=. Death Sentences 18-24 year olds -
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Figure 2b. Persons Sentenced to Death By Year and Age, States
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The same trends are evident when we examine the total number of
death sentences (including re-sentencings), as opposed to the total number
of persons newly sentenced to death (excluding re-sentencings). Figure 2a
shows the changes over time in the total number of death sentences
imposed per year, comparing juvenile defendants with defendants eighteen
to twenty-four years of age. Figure 2b shows the changes over time in the
total number of persons sentenced to death per year (excluding re-
sentencings), comparing the same age groups.95
95 The trends in juvenile death sentences in the post-Stanford era differ in two important
respects from the trends in juvenile death sentences in the decade preceding Stanford. First,
Table 6 shows that the count of juveniles sentenced to death (excluding re-sentencings) from
1980 to 1989 fluctuated in a "roller-coaster" pattern of increases and declines over the
decade. Starting with six juveniles sentenced to death in 1980, the number increased to
thirteen in 1982, then declined to four in 1984 before rising again to eight in 1986. A one-
year decline in 1987 (to two) was followed by another increase in 1988 (to five), then
another decline to one in 1989. Thus, in this decade, no period of decline lasted longer than
two years. In comparison, Table 4 shows that juvenile death sentences in the post-Stanford
period featured longer and more sustained declines of three years (1995-1997) and four
years (2000-2003).
Table 6. Persons Under 18 Sentenced to Death, 1980-1989











Second, the rate of juvenile death sentences per juvenile homicide arrest also is
substantially lower in the post-Stanford era compared to the rate in the decade preceding
Stanford. Although there were more juvenile death sentences post-Stanford compared to the
preceding decade, the juvenile homicide arrest rate was far lower during the 1980s than the
1990s. The national homicide arrest rate for sixteen-year-olds rose from 12 per 100,000 in
1985 to 36 per 100,000 in 1995; the rate for seventeen-year-olds rose from 20 per 100,000 in
1985 to 51 per 100,000 in 1995. See Blumstein, supra note 73, at 20-24. From 1980 to
1989, we calculated that the rate of death sentences per juvenile homicide arrest, in the states
with valid juvenile death penalty statutes, was 1.06. From 1990 to 2003, the comparable rate
was 0.76, about 28% lower. See infra note 104 regarding the limitations of juvenile
homicide arrest data in the UCR.
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B. STATE COMPARISONS
Most juvenile death sentences during the study period were
concentrated in three states: Texas, Florida, and Alabama. Since 1973,
these three states accounted for 114 of the 226 juvenile death sentences in
the United States (50.4%). Tables 6 and 7 show that from 1990 to 2002,
these three states accounted for 65 of the 111 juveniles- newly sentenced to
death (58.6%), and 71 of the 121 total juvenile death sentences (58.7%).
Table 7 and Figures 3a and 3b show that the concentration of juvenile
death sentences in these three states correlates positively with their overall
death sentencing patterns.96 Texas ranks first in juvenile death sentences,
first in death sentences for young adults ages eighteen to twenty-four, and
first in total adult death sentences in the U.S. since 1990. Alabama ranks
second, fourth and fifth, respectively, in these three categories, and Florida
ranks third, second and second, respectively, in these categories. A second
group of states97 sentenced between five and eight juvenile offenders to
death during the study period, ranking them fourth through sixth. Among
these "middle" ranked states, their ranks for number of persons ages
eighteen to twenty-four sentenced to death varied from third (North
Carolina) to thirteenth (South Carolina), and their ranks for total number of
adults sentenced to death ranged from third (North Carolina) to twelfth
(Mississippi).
The lower rate in the 1990s is even more noteworthy given the dramatic increase in
juvenile homicide arrest rates nationally from the decade of the 1980s to the decade of the
1990s and the punitive climate toward juvenile crime that consequently characterized the
1990s. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS
AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 1-2 (1996) (showing that since 1990, every state has adopted
one or more statutory strategies to transfer some chronological juveniles to criminal courts).
See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT (1996) (showing how the boundaries of the juvenile court have been reduced by
punitive attitudes toward adolescent offenders, and the increasing prevalence of violent
crime and minority youths); DAVID GARLAND, CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001) (discussing
changes in societal attitudes toward crime and punishment and their origins in cultural and
political change, both in the U.S. and the U.K.); FRANKLIN E. ZLMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE (1999) (discussing trends toward greater use of adult criminal sanctions for
juvenile offenders).
96 In Figures 4a and 4b, the states are arrayed from left to right according to the number
of persons sentenced to death during the study period (4a) and number of juvenile death
sentences (4b).
97 Those states are Louisiana, Arizona, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia.
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Table 7
Persons Sentenced to Death in States with Valid Juvenile Death Penalty
Law by State, * Age, and Rank, 1990-2002
Age and Rank















































































































































































Sources: SNELL & BONZCAR, supra note 79; Streib, June, supra note 20.
*Montana (1999), Indiana (2002) and Washington (1993) ended capital sentencing for juveniles during
the study period. Data for adults sentenced to death in these three states are only for the period during
which these states were able to sentence a juvenile to death.
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Figure 3a. Persons Sentenced to Death by Age and State, in
Active Juvenile Death Sentencing States, 1990-2002
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Figure 3b. Death Sentences by Age and State, in Active
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As Table 7 shows, there is a small group of states whose rankings on
juvenile death sentencing are inconsistent with their ranking on adult death
sentencing. For example, Oklahoma had only one juvenile offender
sentenced to death between 1990 and 2002, but had 120 adults sentenced to
death during this period, a ratio of 120:1. Pennsylvania similarly had only
two juveniles sentenced to death, but 190 adults sentenced to death, a ratio
of 95:1.
The states with no juveniles sentenced to death during the study period
also generally ranked lowest in number of adults sentenced to death.
Nevertheless, there are three states-Delaware, Idaho, and Indiana-that
had no juvenile death sentences during the study period but had between
fifteen and twenty-nine adult death sentences per state. Accordingly, there
appear to be quite different norms influencing death sentencing patterns for
juveniles and adults in several states. 98
Table 8 shows the trends over time in number of persons sentenced to
death in the three highest ranking juvenile death penalty states-Texas,
Alabama, and Florida-and the other juvenile death penalty states from
1990-2002. The trends over time in these two groups of states suggest
important distinctions in their death sentencing patterns. Figure 4a shows
that the number of juveniles sentenced to death in these three states
exceeded the numbers of juveniles sentenced to death in all other states
combined for most years in the time series. The gap between these three
states and the others was especially large from 1995-97, and again in
1999. 99
98 State ranks can be somewhat misleading when they are considered separately from the
homicide arrests that create a pool of death-eligible defendants or when juvenile and adult
data are aggregated. Professor John Blume and his colleagues reported that from 1976 to
1998, Oklahoma and Nevada imposed the most death sentences per homicide arrest. See
John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165 (2004); see also Adam Liptak, Study Revises Texas' Standing
as a Death Penalty Leader, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 2004, at AI0. These data do not consider
juveniles separately from adults, and Table 6 shows that there are stark differences in
Oklahoma and Nevada between juvenile and adult death sentences. For example, Oklahoma
had one juvenile death sentence compared to 120 adult death sentences, or 0.8% of all death
sentences. In contrast, the comparable rate in Texas is 5.3%; in Florida, the rate is 3.5%, and
in Alabama, the rate is 6.9%. In subsequent analyses, we index the juvenile death sentence
rate to the juvenile homicide arrest rate, in effect disaggregating the results reported by
Professor Blume and his colleagues to develop indicia specific to juvenile death sentences.
See infra Parts IV.C and V.
99 We limit these comparisons to persons sentenced to death; the patterns for total death
sentences are nearly identical.
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Table 8
Number of Persons Sentenced to Death, and Death Sentences, in Texas,
Florida, and Alabama, Compared to Other States, 1990-2002
Texas, Florida, Alabama
Death Sentences Persons
Year Total 18-24 Under 18 Total 18-24 Under 18
1990 76 23 6 69 19 5
1991 85 30 3 79 29 3
1992 90 36 5 79 30 5
1993 77 38 2 75 38 2
1994 113 48 9 104 45 7
1995 94 41 8 93 40 8
1996 86 34 8 79 33 8
1997 70 30 6 68 29 6
1998 93 38 6 91 38 5
1999 85 29 9 80 25 9
2000 66 27 3 66 27 3
2001 49 24 4 48 24 2
2002 58 18 2 55 17 2
Total 1042 416 71 986 394 65
Other Juvenile Death Penalty States
Death Sentences Persons
Year Total 18-24 Under 18 Total 18-24 Under 18
1990 114 30 3 108 28 3
1991 126 44 2 120 42 2
1992 117 37 1 105 36 1
1993 140 51 5 129 47 4
1994 149 53 9 134 50 8
1995 147 49 5 126 45 4
1996 132 42 4 125 39 4
1997 131 47 2 120 45 2
1998 134 48 5 123 44 5
1999 116 40 5 106 34 5
2000 97 25 4 91 23 4
2001 66 21 3 65 20 3
2002 58 17 2 51 15 1
Total 1527 504 50 1403 468 46
SNELL & BONzAR, supra note 79; Streib, June, supm note 20
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Figure 4a. Juveniles Sentenced to Death in High States
Compared to Other States, 1990-2002
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Figure 4b. Persons Ages 18-24 Sentenced to Death in
High States vs. Other States, 1990-2002
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However, the number of juveniles sentenced to death in these three
high-rate states declined beginning in 1997, and (after a one-year increase)
declined sharply after 1999. Accordingly, the general secular decline in
juvenile death sentences was evident in all the juvenile death-penalty states,
not just in the states that used it most often or in other states that had used it
less frequently.
Figure 4b shows the trends in death sentencing of defendants eighteen
to twenty-four years of age for the two groups of states. The trend lines are
nearly identical, and both show a secular decline beginning in 1999 for this
age group. The decline in death sentencing of persons eighteen to twenty-
four, however, is not as steep as the decline for juveniles. Accordingly,
comparing Figures 4a and 4b suggests that the decline in death sentencing
rates is more pronounced for juveniles than for young adults, both in the
states that had used the juvenile death penalty most often and in states that
had used it less frequently. 00 In subsequent multivariate analyses, 101 we
introduce controls for juvenile homicide arrests and populations below age
eighteen in each state and year, so that the trends in juvenile death
sentences are indexed to the homicide arrest rate.
C. JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES AND THE DECLINING HOMICIDE
RATE
The possible counterfactual argument to the claim that declining
numbers of juvenile death sentences signals an evolving standard opposing
capital punishment for juveniles is that any observed decline may simply
reflect declines in juvenile homicide offending. As the supply of juvenile
offenders eligible for death sentences decreases, we would expect the
number of juvenile death sentences to decline. If there is an evolving
standard that is specific to juveniles, we would expect the number of
juvenile death sentences per homicide or per homicide arrest to decline at a
faster rate than the number of adult death sentences per homicide, or per
homicide arrest. But if death sentences are declining generally, we cannot
claim that there is an evolving standard that is specific to juveniles. We
explore this question by examining trends over time, first in the number of
juvenile and adult death sentences per homicide, and second in the number
of juvenile and adult death sentences per homicide arrest.
1. Juvenile and Adult Death Sentences per Homicide
Table 9 shows the number of persons sentenced to death per 1,000
1oo We omitted 2003 from Figure 5a, so that the years align with Figure 5b.
101 See infra section V.
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homicide victimizations in the U.S. froin 1990-2002 for persons under
eighteen, persons ages eighteen to twenty-four, and persons twenty-five and
older. (We include all homicide victimizations to compute the death
sentencing rates, not just homicide victimizations within each
corresponding age group. Although some juveniles commit homicides
against persons within their own age group, most juvenile homicide
offenders kill persons outside their own age group, usually persons three or
more years older. 102)
The data in Table 9 show that all three age-specific distributions
reflect a curvilinear pattern of increases followed by declines. However,
the decline is greater for persons below eighteen years of age. From 1994
to 2002, the rate of death sentences per homicide for juveniles declined
from 1.29 in 1994 to 0.35 in 2002, a decline of 72.9%. Since 1999, the rate
declined from 1.67 per 1,000 juvenile homicide arrests to 0.35 in 2002, a
decline of 79.0%.
Both of these substantial declines for juvenile homicide offenders were
far greater than the declines for adults. The number of homicide offenders
ages eighteen to twenty-four sentenced to death per 1,000 homicide
victimizations declined by 58.4% from the peak of 9.01 death sentences per
homicide in 1998 to a low of 3.75 in 2002.103 Among persons twenty-five
and older, death sentences per 1,000 homicide victimizations declined
37.9%, from a peak of 13.46 in 1999 to 8.31 in 2002. Figures 6a, 6b and 6c
illustrate this comparative difference in the declines in juvenile homicide
arrests per 1,000 homicides.
While these figures suggest a sharp contrast between the trends for
juvenile and adult death sentencing, they are hardly dispositive of the claim
that juvenile death sentencing rates are declining faster than rates for adults.
That is, we cannot rely solely on the death sentencing rate per homicide
102 From 1985 to 1995, in cases where the age of the offender is known, about one in
four of the victims of homicide offenders ages thirteen to seventeen were within the same
age group. Three-fourths of the victims of juvenile homicide offenders were eighteen years
of age or older, and most of those were age twenty-five and older. See Philip J. Cook &
John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 27, 48-
50 & 48-50 tbls.3-5 (1998). From 1988-99, we analyzed the Supplemental Homicide
Reports (SHR) to measure the relationship between age of victim and age of offender in
homicide cases where the offender age is known. See Table 2 and Appendix A (data not
shown, available from authors). We find a pattern nearly identical to the pattern found by
Cook and Laub: 25.5% of juvenile homicide offenders kill persons who also are juveniles,
while 74.5% kill persons who are over age seventeen. Cook and Laub show in Tables 4 and
5 that the these patterns are stable for 1985, 1991, and 1995, despite enormous differences in
the juvenile homicide arrest rate at that time.
103 2002 is the last year when accurate age-specific homicide arrest data are available
nationally.
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victimization. Many homicides may not be eligible for capital punishment;
clearance rates for homicides vary extensively over time and across
jurisdictions; and changing laws can expand or narrow the types of crimes
that may qualify for capital punishment. Having said that, there is no
reason to assume that the percentage of offenders who are deemed to be
death-eligible would vary across states, or that this proportion within any
state would vary one year to the next. In other words, although not all
homicides are eligible for capital punishment, there is no reason to expect
variation between states, or from one year to the next within any one state,
in the proportion of homicides in any age group that are capital offenses,
and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the estimates are not biased by
these factors.
Table 9
Persons Sentenced to Death Per 1,000 Homicides by Year and Age,
1990-2002
Age
Year <17 18-24 > 25 Total
1990 .68 4.02 10.61 15.31
1991 .40 5.69 9.85 15.94
1992 .51 5.64 9.65 15.80
1993 .50 7.02 9.42 16.94
1994 1.29 8.20 11.05 20.63
1995 1.12 7.95 11.41 20.48
1996 1.20 7.17 11.96 20.33
1997 .82 7.57 10.95 19.34
1998 1.10 9.01 13.41 23.51
1999 1.67 7.03 13.46 22.15
2000 .83 5.96 12.15 18.95
2001 .58 5.06 7.48 13.11
2002 .35 3.75 8.31 12.41
Source: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2001 (2002);
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 80; Streib, April, supra note 20.
Another way to consider these data is to examine the ratio of persons
sentenced to death per 1,000 homicides in the various age groups. In 1998,
for example, based on the figures in Table 9, the ratio of persons eighteen to
twenty-four sentenced to death per homicide to juveniles sentenced to death
per homicide was 8.2 (9.01 1 1.10). In 2002, the ratio was 10.71 (3.75 1
0.35). In 1998, the ratio of persons over age twenty-five sentenced to death
per homicide to juveniles sentenced to death per homicide was 12.2 (13.41 I
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1.10); in 2002, it was 23.7 (8.31 I 0.35). Thus, there was a substantial gap
in death sentences per homicide between juveniles and adults, and the gap
increased over time. While prosecutors and juries have always been more
reluctant to seek or use capital punishment for juveniles, that reluctance
seems to be growing steadily.
2. Juvenile and Adult Death Sentences per Homicide Arrest
We next turn to death sentences per homicide arrest. Homicide arrests
are an important baseline from which to gauge trends in death sentences,
since arrestees are the supply of defendants for capital trials and sentences.
Not all arrests for homicide are for capital murder, but again we assume that
between-state differences in types of homicide and clearance rates are
stable within years, and therefore year-to-year differences in the juvenile-
adult comparisons are reliable estimators of the attitudes of juries and
prosecutors when we compare states over time. In Figure 5 and Table 10,
we compute the rate of persons sentenced to death per 100 homicide arrests
both for juveniles and for all adults, for the post-Stanford era.'0 4
104 We use all juvenile homicide arrests for persons below eighteen years of age, rather
than specific counts of homicide arrests for sixteen- and seventeen-year old homicide
offenders. (Specific counts of persons sixteen and seventeen years of age who were death-
eligible do not exist.) There are both conceptual and practical reasons for this decision.
The practical reasons are data availability and missing data. To estimate the count of
homicide arrests of sixteen- and seventeen-year olds by state and year, we first turned to the
Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), a specialized homicide data reporting system
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as part of its Uniform Crime Report
system. The data for 1975-97 are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-
bin/bob/archive?study=9028. Beginning in 1998, the data for each year are maintained in
separate files. The data for 1998 are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-
bin/bob/archive?study=2906. The data for 1999 are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
cgi-binibob/archive?study=3162. The data for 2000 are available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archive?study=33448. For 2001, the data are
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archive?study=3722, and for 2002, the
data are available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archive?study=3999. These
data do report the age of the offender, but they do not provide information on arrestees'
capital eligibility. There are critical missing data problems in the SHR, as well. These data
do not provide full coverage of all states, either within a given year, or over time. For
example, data for Florida are absent from the Supplementary Homicide Reports for nine of
the fourteen study years. For states with reported events, it is unknown if the observed
variation in the number reporting agencies is due to actual variation in the number of
agencies with homicide arrests, or to a failure to report. For example, homicide arrest data
for Alabama are based on as few as two reporting agencies in 1999 and as many as 100 in
1994. Most states, large and small alike, follow this pattern. For example, the range in
Texas is 305 to 226 reporting agencies and in Montana the range is one to fourteen reporting
agencies over the study period. Using incomplete data from the SHR on age-specific
juvenile homicide arrests would risk censoring whole states and years, and would likely bias
estimates of juvenile death sentences by inflating the rate at which juveniles are sentenced to
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In these analyses, we lag the homicide arrests by two years, to reflect
the fact that there is generally a significant lapse of time between arrest and
sentencing. We estimate an interval of two years based on prior research on
processing of capital cases. 10 5 To verify the validity of the two-year time
lag, we estimated the time from arrest to death sentence based on records in
samples of ten cases from 1990 to 1999 in Texas, Florida and Alabama, the
three states with the highest number and percentage of juvenile death
sentences. 10 6 The lag ranged from seven to thirty-eight months across these
cases; the average time lag was 21.9 months, and the median time lag was
twenty-four months. Accordingly, we use a time lag of twenty-four months
in estimating the duration from arrest to sentencing.
death in some states but not others.
To account for missing data, we then turned to the SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, available at www.albany.edu/sourcebook (last visited July 7, 2004). The
Sourcebook integrates data from over 100 sources of criminal justice information in the
United States. The Sourcebook reports the total number of persons under the age of eighteen
arrested for homicide, but not age-specific counts by state and year. In general, the
Sourcebook provided fuller coverage and, when all juvenile arrests were compared between
these two data sources, consistently reported a higher number of juvenile arrests.
We therefore adopted a conservative approach: for each state-year observation, we
used the larger number of homicide arrests of persons under the age of eighteen from the
SHR and the Sourcebook. Since we use all juvenile homicide arrests, including arrests of
those under sixteen and therefore too young to be sentenced to death, our calculation of the
rate at which juveniles are sentenced to death is somewhat lower than the rate would be if
only arrests of sixteen-and seventeen-year olds were considered. Nevertheless, since all
states and years are similarly affected by this bias, and assuming the age-specific distribution
of juvenile homicide arrests varies little from year to year, we can make reliable
comparisons over time between states. See Alfred Blumstein, supra note 73, at 20-24.
In the political ecology of states and courts that sentence juvenile homicide offenders,
it is reasonable to assume that death sentences for eligible juvenile offenders (ages sixteen
and seventeen) would be influenced by total patterns of juvenile homicide, especially those
that receive political attention and popular interest. These totals will include juvenile
homicide offenders under sixteen, whose actions may well be generalized politically and
culturally to the broader pool of juvenile homicide offenders.
1o5 See Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part I, supra note 65.
106 We reviewed ten randomly selected cases from both urban and rural counties across
each state, representing each state's major population center as well as medium- and small-
sized counties. The range of years spanned the decade from 1990-2000. We excluded 2001
and later due to the small number of juvenile death sentences and the attendant sampling
problems. We computed the time from incident to arrest, and then from arrest to death
sentence. In Florida, the lag time from arrest to sentencing ranged from seven to twenty-six
months, and averaged 15.8 months. In Alabama, the average length of time between arrest
and death sentence was twenty-six months, with a range of fifteen to thirty-eight months. In
Texas, the lag time from arrest to sentence was 23.4 months, with a range of eleven to thirty-
eight months. Data and citations are available from the authors.
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Figure 5. Persons Sentenced to Death Per 100
Homicide Arrests Lagged by Two Years,
1990-2003
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Table 10 and Figure 5 show that prior to 1999, the rate of juveniles
sentenced to death per 100 homicide arrests varied from year to year with
no consistent upward or downward trend. Although the rate at which
juveniles were sentenced to death was well below the rate for adults
throughout the period, the two trend lines moved roughly in lockstep. Since
1999-the peak year for juveniles-the rate of decline in the rate of
juveniles sentenced to death per juvenile homicide arrest has been far
greater than the decline in the rate for adults since its peak (in 1998). The
rate for juvenile cases declined from 1.61 to .20 between 1999 and 2003, a
drop of 87.6%; by comparison, for adult cases, the rate declined from 3.46
to 2.23 between 1998 and 2002, a drop of 35.5%. Thus, the rate of decline
for juveniles during this period was more than 2.5 times the rate of decline
for adults. By any mathematical index of comparative rate change, the
change for juvenile death sentences has been far greater than that for adult
death sentences.
This trend was evident both in the three high-rate states and in states
that sentence juveniles to death less frequently. Figure 6a shows the trend
for Florida, Alabama, and Texas from 1990 to 2002. (Data for adult death
sentences in 2003 have not yet been released). Since 1998, there has been a
very small decline in adults sentenced to death per 100 homicide arrests in
the three high-rate states. Figure 6a shows that the rate fell from 3.85 adults
sentenced to death per 100 homicide arrests in 1998 to 3.35 in 2002, a
decline of 13.0%. For juveniles, on the other hand, there was a sharp
decline in the rate of persons sentenced to death per homicide arrest, from
3.06 in 1999 to 1.07 in 2002-a decline of 65%. Even if we consider the
1999 peak as an outlier or temporary departure from a longer-term trend,
the juvenile rate still declined from its 1990 rate of 1.61 to the 2002 rate of
1.07, for a drop of 33.5%. Again, the rate of decline for juvenile death
sentences per homicide arrests is twice that of adults. Either interpretation
leads to the conclusion that there has been a secular decline in the
frequency of juvenile death sentences in the three states that account for the
majority of juvenile death sentences-and that the decline has been
significantly greater than the analogous decline for adults.
But the downward trend is not confined to these three states. In the
remaining juvenile death penalty states, the decline in the rate of juveniles
sentenced to death per 100 juvenile homicide arrests was greater than the
decline for adults. As Figure 6b shows, the rate for juveniles declined from
0.87 in 1999 to .27 in 2002, a drop of 69.0%. By comparison, the adult rate
dropped from a peak of 3.23 in 1998 to 1.65 in 2002, a drop of 48.9%.
These figures show that in both high- and low-rate death sentencing
states, the decline in the rate at which juveniles are sentenced to death
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significantly outstrips the analogous decline in adult death sentencing.
Once again, these trends support the conclusion that societal norms are
shifting away from the use of the juvenile death penalty.
Figure 6a. Persons Sentenced to Death Per 100 Homicide
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Figure 6b. Persons Sentenced to Death Per 100
Homicide Arrests Lagged Two Years, Medium and Low
Juvenile Death Sentencing States, 1990-2002
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V. MODELING THE DECLINE IN JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES: EVIDENCE
OF EVOLVING NORMS
The preceding sections show that there has been a large and sustained
decline in the use of the juvenile death penalty in state courts since 1989,
compared to declines in death sentences for adults. The decline for
juveniles is greater than the decline for adults in absolute numbers, and it is
also greater than the analogous decline for adults after sentencing rates are
indexed to the homicide rate and to the homicide arrest rate.
There are several possible counterfactual explanations for the decline
in juvenile death sentences: a decline in the supply of cases due to a lower
murder rate and fewer juvenile homicide arrests; changes in the size of the
youth population; a general social trend opposing death sentences for both
young adults (ages eighteen to twenty-four) and juveniles; the presence of
other social and political factors that would alter the political ecology and
legal context of charging and death sentencing.' 0 7 The growing prevalence
of exonerations in capital cases 08 and the high rate of reversals of capital
sentences in state appellate courts' 0 9 may also contribute to the reluctance
of juries to impose death sentences. The contribution of these factors may
signal a loss of faith in the capacity to reliably and accurately implement
capital sentences, but not a normative shift away from the use of the penalty
on juvenile offenders.
Accordingly, we tested whether changes in the social, political, and
normative cultures of the United States have produced an evolving standard
that increasingly opposes the use of capital punishment specifically for
juveniles. We estimated multivariate statistical models to examine the
contributions of several factors that might produce a decline in juvenile
death sentences, including the possible counterfactual explanations that




In the models that follow, the dependent variable is juveniles
107 See, e.g., Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II, supra note 65 (discussing social
and political factors that influence error rates in capital sentences).
108 For a listing of exonerations of persons who received death sentences since 1989, see
Gross et al., Exonerations early draft, supra note 54, at app. at 27-31.
109 See, e.g., Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part I, supra note 65; Liebman et al., A
Broken System, Part 11, supra note 65.
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sentenced to death; we did not include re-sentences for the reasons
discussed earlier. The general analytic model estimates the probability of a
juvenile death sentence in a state-year, controlling for the number of
juvenile homicide arrests lagged by two years (i.e., the supply of persons
eligible for the death penalty)." 10 In the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model,
we specify an inflation factor that adjusts for the excessive number of zeros
in the dataset. Most of the zeros are located in states with medium and low
total death sentencing rates."' Therefore, we include a binary variable as
an indicator of whether the state is one of those that produces a high
number of zeros.
We include an indicator for both a linear time trend (Time) and a
quadratic time trend (Time x Time, or Time2). Time2 accounts for the non-
linear shape of the distribution of both juvenile death sentences and juvenile
homicide arrests over the study period. 12 We include a dummy (binary)
variable for the most recent four-year period of sustained decline in juvenile
death sentences (2000-2003) to test whether the number of juvenile death
sentences after the 1999 spike is lower than in the years before (Post-1999).
We then include an interaction term in separate models-a multiplier
of each of the time trends by the Post-1999 variable-to test specifically
whether the slope of the downward trend after 1999 is significant. This is a
critical test of the existence of an evolving standard regarding the juvenile
death penalty. By testing for the significance of the slope (downward
trend) with both the linear and quadratic time trend, we can show whether
the rate of change-that is, the slope of the downward trend-is a
significant predictor of the juvenile death sentencing rate. We do this
separately for the interaction of the post-1999 measure with the linear time
trend (TIME) and the quadratic time trend (TIME2 ), and report the results
as separate models. In each table, we report the regression coefficients,
whether they are statistically significant, and the overall model statistics
that show its strength and predictive power. As we show below, we obtain
similar results with similar implications using these two constructions of the
time trend.
The models control for the supply of juvenile homicide defendants by
including the number of juvenile homicide arrests as an "offset" in the
110 The time lag between arrest and death sentencing for juveniles is approximately two
years. See supra Part IV.C.2.
1 Texas, Florida, and Alabama account for 65 of the 112 juveniles sentenced to death
from 1990-2003. See supra Tables 6-7.
112 This curvilinear distribution is an inverted "U", with an increase in the early 1990s
followed by a peak in 1994 and then a decline (with an interim spike in 1999) through 2003.
See supra Figures 3a and 3b.
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model."13 We lag the count of juvenile homicide arrests by two years, 14
and use the logged value to relieve the effects of skewness and outliers on
the regression models. The use of an offset is a method for specifying an
"exposure" variable, which identifies the size of the population that might
be affected by the causal factors.1 15  The results and predicted death
sentencing rates are adjusted to reflect this exposure measure, but a
significance test for this variable is not computed in this procedure. In the
ZIP model, we include an "inflation" factor that adjusts the results to reflect
the large number of zero observations. In the non-inflated Hurdle Poisson
models, we address this factor by using a binary (dummy) variable that
indicates whether the state is a medium or low death sentencing state to
adjust for zero-inflation." 6  The exposure and inflation measures are
included in each iteration (stage) of the analyses. Note that we do not
report the effects of the inflator in either set of models (it was not
significant in either specification).
We also include a control variable for the number of death sentences
for eighteen to twenty-four year old defendants in each state-year during the
period. We use the natural log of this count, since the count is skewed. By
controlling for death sentences in this next oldest age bracket, we can
determine if the decline in juvenile death sentences is predicted by a more
general secular trend opposing the death penalty, or if the decline for
juveniles is age-specific and distinct from other norms on capital
punishment.
Additional control variables include the murder rate per 100,000
population and the residual of the murder rate. The residual is an estimator
that allows us to control for unmeasured variables that contribute to state-
level variation in the murder rate. Since the murder rate is correlated with
several state-level social structural variables, 17 we estimated regression
113 The offset is the functional equivalent of computing a rate of death sentences per
juvenile homicide arrest. But by including the count as the dependent variable, and the
offset as a predictor, we allow for the possibility that the joint distributions may vary over
time. This is one of the essential components of a Poisson model. See GREENE, supra note
84.
114 The two year time lag is designed to adjust for the time delay between arrest and
sentencing. See supra Part IV.C.2.
115 BRUCE K. ARMSTRONG ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ExPosURE MEASUREMENT IN
EPIDEMIOLOGY (1992).
116 See Table 3, supra, for data on the number of death sentences by state.
117 Murder and social structural variables are endogenous, and determining causal
direction often is difficult. See, e.g., Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, The Structural
Context of Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in Process, 65 Am. Soc. REV. 547
(2000); Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any
Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. Soc. 922, 922-32 (1990). See
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equations that predict the homicide rate in each state-year from these
variables. The unstandardized residuals from these regressions represent
the components of the murder rate that reflect factors that are not
represented by these well-known and widely tested social structural factors.
Since these same state-level social structural factors are correlated with
death-sentencing rates, 1 8 we include several in the models predicting
juvenile death sentences. We also include measures of political pressure
and punitiveness that were significant predictors of death sentencing and
error rates in death sentences. 1 9 Finally, we include the percentage of the
total population that is below age eighteen as a proxy for the size of the
population at risk for both juvenile homicide and capital punishment.
To test for the robustness of these models, we re-estimated each set-
ZIP and Poisson models-using a series of alternate assumptions, to
demonstrate the stability of the results using alternate specifications of the
basic findings. These alternate specifications address the disproportionate
contributions of the three high juvenile death sentencing states to the
overall distribution of juvenile death sentences. Accordingly, we first
estimate models with all states, followed by a model excluding Texas, and a
third model excluding the three high death sentencing states of Texas,
Florida, and Alabama. In this way, we can estimate the generality of the
decline in juvenile death sentences in both high- and low-rate states.
Finally, for each of the full models-the models with all predictors with the
linear interaction term, and the models with all predictors and the quadratic
interaction term-we graphically show the adjusted rate of juvenile death
sentences that accounts for the influence of the other factors. The means
and standard deviations of all the variables are shown in Appendix A.
generally Robert J. Sampson & Janet H. Lauritsen, Individual-, Situational-, and
Community-Level Risk Factors, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 1 (A.J.
Reiss, Jr. & J.A. Roth eds., 1994). In addition, many of the social structural factors that
explain and predict homicide rates at the state level also predict death sentencing rates. See
Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part 11, supra note 65. Including both homicide and social
structure in the same model raises risks of multicollinearity and endogeneity that would
distort the regression results. Also, since the murder rate is serially correlated from year to
year, controls are needed to adjust for the potential inflation of its contribution to death
sentencing. Computing the residual accomplishes this. Accordingly, we use a measure of
the residual of the murder rate to account for the unique contributions of the murder rate in
each year to the prediction of juvenile death sentences. We compute the residual by
estimating a regression model with the murder rate as the predictor and social structural
variables, such as poverty and family structure, as the predictors.
118 See Blume et al., supra note 98; Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II, supra note
65.
119 See Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part 11, supra note 65.
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2. Testing for the Effects of Exonerations
To test for the influence of exonerations on the decline in juvenile
death sentences, we extended the first set of Poisson models to include
measures of the prevalence of exonerations both within each state and in the
broader national context. We computed two- and three-year averages for
the years preceding each year in the time series for each state. This was
done for two reasons. First, we assume that the effects of exonerations
would not be limited to only those that might have occurred in the
preceding year. The residual perceptual effects of salient events such as
exonerations may last for two or three years; beyond that time interval, the
effects of exonerations would be too distal to presume an effect, or would
be confounded with other intervening effects. Second, we computed
averages because of the sparseness of the data, and the burden of an
excessive number of zeros that might skew the parameter estimates in the
Poisson regression models.12
0
Accordingly, to measure the effects of within-state exonerations, we
computed each state's average number of exonerations for both two-and
three-year intervals preceding each year in the study. To measure the
effects of the broader national context in which exonerations take place, we
computed the national average of exonerations in all death penalty states for
the preceding two-and three-year intervals for each year in the study. We
also computed the total number of prior exonerations, both within each state
and nationally, for each year in the series. For the national exoneration
data, we computed total exonerations plus two- and three-year averages in
the preceding years, in three different ways: (1) all exonerations in all
death penalty states, (2) all exonerations in juvenile death penalty states
only, and (3) capital exonerations in all death penalty states.
We then computed an interaction term that combined the within-state
and national exoneration effects to estimate the combined effects of the two
sources of exonerations. The interaction term is the most important of the
predictors in the model, providing a measure of the multiplicative effects of
the state or national measures and capturing two independent sources of the
potential effects of exonerations on juror or judge decision making. We
tested these models using just the more conservative hurdle Poisson
120 There were fifty-one state-year data points with one or more exonerations in capital
cases in the juvenile death penalty states since 1989, only 12.3% of the 334 state-year data
points. Because a Poisson distribution with a parameter X is a linear function of a set of
explanatory variables (In X), an excessive number of zeros in a predictor would exert a
downward bias on the estimation of that predictor and potentially inflate the parameter
estimates of other predictors in the linear model. See PETER KENNEDY, A GUME TO
ECONOMETRmcs 245 (3d ed. 1994).
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specification.
B. RESULTS
1. Identifying the Decline in Juvenile Death Sentences
The results of the models using the linear interaction term are shown in
Table 11. The first three columns in Table 11 report the results of the ZIP
models, and the second three report results of (non-zero-inflated) Poisson
regressions. In each cell, we show the regression coefficient and the
standard error (in parentheses). We report statistical significance at both
the p < .05 and p < .10 levels.
121
In the full model in Table 11, the Post-1999 * TIME interaction is
significant: the coefficient of -.81 shows that the downward trend in death
sentences after 1999 is statistically significant after controlling for the
number of juvenile homicide arrests, the general time trends, the adult (ages
eighteen to twenty-four) death sentence rate, the murder rate, the residual of
the murder rate, 22 the youth population, and the state covariates. Note also
that the murder rate is significant and positive: there are more death
sentences in state-years with higher homicide rates.
The model excluding Texas is shown in the second column of Table
11. We exclude Texas because of its substantially higher number of both
juvenile and adult death sentences, including the high proportion of all
death sentences that are given to juveniles. This concentration of death
sentences not only is substantively important, but it also carries the
possibility of biasing or skewing the results due to a disproportionate
contribution made by one state.
123
This model produces the same result. In fact, the coefficient for the
time interaction is slightly larger (-.83). This model shows that in states
other than Texas, there is a significant downward trend in juvenile death
sentences after 1999, controlling for the number of juvenile homicide
arrests, adult death sentences (ages eighteen to twenty-four), the murder
rate, and the youth population.
121 Note that the tables do not show the results for the state covariates, since they are not
directly related to the research question. These data are available from the authors.
122 The residual measures the year-to-year variation in homicide rates and its relationship
to social structural factors that predict both death sentences and homicide rates. See supra
note 115 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Dejti
Vu All Over Again?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (showing that the correlation
between execution and homicide is heavily skewed by the high incidence of execution in
Texas).
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The third column in Table 11 shows the results of the ZIP regressions,
this time excluding the three states with the highest number of juvenile
death sentences. These states accounted for more than half of the juvenile
death sentences since 1990.124 This time, none of the predictors is
statistically significant. The coefficient for the time interaction is slightly
lower than in the other two ZIP models (-.70), but it is not statistically
significant (p=.l 1). The result is not surprising, considering how sparse
death sentencing was after 1999 in the other states with valid juvenile death
penalty statutes.
The next three columns in Table 11 show results of the non-zero-
inflated Poisson regressions. Recall that we used this form of Poisson
regression because the Vuong tests on the ZIP models were inconclusive.
The conservative approach in that situation is to estimate the models using
Poisson methods, and compare the similarity of the two sets of results. The
pattern of results in all three models is nearly identical. The coefficients are
nearly identical, and the pattern of statistical significance is similar. The
coefficient for the interaction term again approaches significance (p=. 12),
but does not reach the standard threshold of p=.05. The only difference
between the ZIP and Poisson models in the third and sixth models is in the
coefficients for the murder rate. This predictor is not significant in the
model excluding the three high juvenile death sentencing states.
Overall, the regression models reported in Table 11 show a statistically
significant downward trend in juvenile death sentences in the years after
1999 across a range of models that control for a wide range of social and
legal factors, and under two different modeling strategies.
Table 12 shows a parallel set of analyses, using the quadratic
interaction term of Post-1999 * Time2 , substituting the quadratic term
TIME 2 in the interactions with the post-1999 indicator. This is an alternate
test of the significance of the downward slope of death sentences, a more
restrictive test that specifies a more accelerated decline. A significant
interaction term under these conditions would signify that the downward
slope meets a more rigorous and demanding test of its trajectory over time.
124 See Streib, December, supra note 20.
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Table 13
Persons Sentenced to Death by State and Year, 2000-2003
Year
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Texas 2 1 1 4
Alabama 1 1
Florida 1 1 2
Arizona 1 1 1 3
North Carolina 1 2 3


















Total 7 5 3 1 16
§ Indiana banned the death penalty for juveniles by statute in 2002.
* Wyoming and South Dakota banned the death penalty for juveniles by legislation in 2004.
t Missouri banned the death penalty for juveniles in August, 2003.
Source: Streib, June, supra note 20.
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The pattern of results is identical. The coefficients for the interaction
of TIME2 * Post- 1999 are smaller compared to the coefficients in Table 11,
but this is not surprising given the more demanding test using the quadratic
time interaction term. Even with this more restrictive test, the quadratic
time interaction is statistically significant in four of the six models; it is not
significant in the models that exclude the three high juvenile death penalty
states (Texas, Alabama and Florida).
Overall, the results in Tables 11 and 12 provide consistent evidence
under a variety of measurement and model specification conditions of a
significant downward trend in juvenile death sentences in the United States,
especially in the period following 1999. Only when we exclude the three
high states is the critical interaction term not significant.
The lack of significance when these three states are excluded may be
the result of the extreme sparseness of juvenile death sentences beginning
in 2000, especially in the other states. Table 13 shows that seventy-two of
the eighty possible state-year observations are zeros for the states, other
than Texas, Alabama, and Florida, that had valid statutes during this time.
Only one state (North Carolina) had more than one juvenile death sentence
in any year during that period. This is a greater proportion of zeros than is
observed across the earlier period (1990-1999), when 199 of 243
observations were zero, and for the entire study period, when 264 of 334
observations were zero. It is not surprising, then, that the third and sixth
models in each table are not significant. Achieving a valid statistical
prediction of such rare events is difficult, even under optimal and efficient
measurement and sampling conditions. These patterns of sparse data
provide additional evidence of the decline of juvenile death sentencing
since 1999.
In the last stage of the analysis, we generated predicted values for
juvenile death sentences that are adjusted for the explanatory variables in
the regression model. That is, we show the predicted rates of juvenile death
sentences per juvenile homicide arrest, adjusted for all the predictors in
these models. Figures 7 and 8 show the predicted values for juvenile death
sentences per juvenile homicide arrest that were generated from the full
models (with all states) in Tables 11 and 12. On a second axis, we show the
juvenile homicide arrest count, lagged by two years as it is in the
multivariate models. 1
25
125 For example, the 1990 predicted JDS rate is predicted from the 1988 juvenile
homicide arrest count. The 1988 time point for juvenile arrests is shown in conjunction with
the 1990 JDS data point. At the other end of the series, the 2001 juvenile homicide arrest
count is shown with the 2003 JDS data point.
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Figure 7. Juvenile Death Sentences per Year, Adjusted for
Predictors including Linear Trend, by Juvenile Homicide
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Figure 8. Juvenile Death Sentences per Year, Adjusted for
Predictors including Quadratic Time Trend, by Juvenile
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Figure 9 uses the linear Time interaction term to compute the predicted
juvenile death sentence rates; Figure 7 uses the more restrictive adjustment
based on the quadratic (Time2) interaction. The figures are nearly identical.
They show that the peak adjusted rate of juvenile death sentences per
juvenile homicide arrest was in 1996 (earlier than 1999), and declined
thereafter other than a one-year increase in 1999. The figures also show a
widening gap between the predicted values for juvenile death sentences and
juvenile homicide arrests beginning in 2000. This four-year sustained
decline in juvenile death sentencing, when indexed to the juvenile homicide
arrest rate, and controlling for the murder rate, together with the longer
seven-year decline in the adjusted rates, suggests the presence of legal and
social dynamics that have reduced the use of the juvenile death penalty
nearly to zero. Finally, in Figures 9 and 10, we show the predicted rates of
juvenile death sentences together with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). A
CI is a range of values that has a high probability of containing the effect or
parameter being estimated. 26 If other information about the value of the
parameter is available, it should be taken into consideration when assessing
the likelihood that the interval contains the parameter. In this context, this
means that the effects of time trends, juvenile homicide arrests, the murder
rate, population size, and social and political covariates are included in the
estimation of the confidence intervals for each year. Generally, the width
of the CI gives us some idea about how uncertain we are about the
unknown parameter (see precision). When the data are sparse, as in the
case of the declining number of juvenile death sentences and the generally
high number of zeros across the study period, a wider confidence interval
reflects the sensitivity of the estimates of these very low frequency events
to the predictors that are included in the statistical model.
Figures 9 and 10 show again that the predicted juvenile death sentence
rate per juvenile homicide arrest is declining over time. The trends are
nearly identical for either of the two predictions: the predicted rate
controlling for the linear interaction term of Post-1999 by Time, or the
more restrictive condition of Post-1999 by Time2. Generally, the predicted
rate of juvenile death sentences per juvenile homicide arrest is declining,
especially since 1999, and the confidence intervals are stable throughout the
period.
126 The 95% confidence interval is constructed in such a way that 95% of such intervals
will contain the parameter. Similarly, with a 99% confidence interval, 99% of the
confidence intervals will contain the parameter. For example, if the parameter being
estimated were i, the 95% confidence interval might look like:
12.5 - [pA- 30.2
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Figure 9. Juvenile Death Sentences per Juvenile Homicide
Arrest by Year with 95%Confidence Intervals, Adjusted for
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Figure 10. Juvenile Death Sentences Per Juvenile Homicide
Arrest by Year with 95%Confidence Intervals, Adjusted for
Quadratic lime Trend and Other Predictors, 1990-2003
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While the confidence intervals widen after 1999, they do not widen to
an extent that would raise doubts about the functional form of the overall
time trend. Moreover, the widening confidence intervals are a reflection of
the sparseness of the data beyond 1999: from fourteen juvenile death
sentences in 1999 to seven (2000), five (2001), three (2002) and one (2003)
(see Table 13). The estimates of death sentences per homicide are
particularly sensitive under these conditions, a factor that accounts in part
for the widening confidence intervals. But the fact of one death sentence in
2003, and the small and declining number in the preceding years, is
unavoidable and uncontestable. The stability and narrow bite of the CIs
under these conditions suggests that the predicted rate of death sentences
per juvenile homicide rate is reliable.
2. The Effects of Exoneration on Juvenile Death Sentences
We estimated a set of models that included several measures of both
within-state and national patterns of exonerations. These measures were
added to the models shown in Table 12. These models, estimated with
quadratic time trends and using a hurdle Poisson specification, were the
more stringent test of the decline in juvenile death sentences. Here, we
show the results in a slightly different form. In Table 14, we show the
complete results of one regression model to illustrate the model form and its
results. In Table 15, we summarize the results of the full set of models,
showing only the probabilities associated with the regression coefficient for
each innocence measure. As in the previous models, all models again were
estimated with the full range of state covariates and controls for murder
rates, adults death sentences, and population.
Table 14 shows that recent capital exonerations exert a statistically
significant downward influence on the number of juvenile death sentences
since 1989. The interaction of the two sources of exonerations combines to
significantly lower the number of juvenile death sentences. The effect is
significant (p=.0 5 4), and the exponentiated regression coefficient
(exp{f3}=.654) suggests that juvenile death sentences are 35% less likely to
occur in the presence of a recent capital exoneration either within the state
or nationally. Table 14 also retains the important finding that juvenile
death sentences had significantly declined since 1999, with the same
controls for murder and arrest rates as well as adult death sentences and
social and political factors. In addition to the substantive importance of the
exoneration finding in Table 14, it also shows that these effects are evident
after controlling for the secular trend of declining juvenile death sentences.
As before, we generated predicted values for juvenile death sentences
that are adjusted for the explanatory variables in the regression model, this
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time including both the two-year within-state and three-year national
averages of capital exonerations. In Figures 11 and 12, we show the
predicted rates of juvenile death sentences per juvenile homicide arrest,
adjusted for all the predictors in Table 14. The results are essentially
unchanged. Figures 11 shows the predicted values for juvenile death
sentences per juvenile homicide arrest. On a second axis, we show the
juvenile homicide arrest count, lagged by two years as it is in the
multivariate models. Figure II uses the restrictive prediction based on the
quadratic (Time2) interaction. Figure 12 shows the predicted rates of
juvenile death sentences together with 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
Table 14. Poisson Regression of Exonerations on Juvenile Death Sentences, Controlling
for Time Trends, Murder Rates, Juvenile Homicide Arrests, and State Covariates
95% C!
B SE p() Lower Upper
Time -.373 .291 -1.28 .200 -.94 .20
Time2  .032 .024 1.35 .178 -.025 .08
DS Persons 18-24 .120 .197 .61 .543 -.276 .51
Post 1999 3.467 1.730 2.00 .045 .08 6.86
Post99*Time2 -.034 .014 -2.42 .015 -.06 -.01
Murder Rate (log) 1.243 .768 1.62 .105 -.26 2.75
Murder Residual -.020 .089 -.22 .823 -. 19 .15
Population > 18 -. 161 .225 -.72 .474 -.60 .28
Exonerations
National 3yr Average .072 .180 .40 .689 -.28 .42
State 2yr Average 2.659 1.151 2.31 .021 .40 4.92
Interaction -.424 .220 -1.93 .054 -.86 .01
State Covariates
B/W Homicide Ratio -.076 .051 -1.46 .145 -.18 .03
% Black Population .021 2.496 0.01 .993 -4.87 4.91
% Urban .005 .013 0.35 .725 -.02 .03
Political Pressure -.037 .088 -0.42 .673 -.21 .14
Punitiveness .152 .055 2.78 .005 .04 .26
Constant -6.054 3.464 -1.75 .081 -12.84 .74
Chi square = 48.08, p = .000
Log likelihood = - 170.82075
PseudoR 2 = .123
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Rgure 11. Juvenile Death Sentences, Adjusted for State and National
Exonerations with Quadratic lime Trend, and Juvenile Homicide Arrests
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Figure 12. Juvenile Death Sentences per Juvenile Homicide Arrest
with 95%Confidence Intervals, Adjusted for State and National
Exonerations with Quadratic ime Trend and Other Predictors, 1990-
2003





1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
[Vol. 95
2005] DECLINE OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 491
Figures 11 and 12 are nearly identical to Figures 8 and 10, and lead to
identical conclusions. They show that the peak adjusted rate of juvenile
death sentences per juvenile homicide arrest was in 1996 (earlier than
1999), and declined thereafter other than a one-year increase in 1999. As
before, the graphs also show a widening gap between the predicted values
for juvenile death sentences and juvenile homicide arrests beginning in
2000.
Accordingly, the addition of exoneration data seems to add little to the
explanation and prediction of the declining pattern juvenile death sentences
following Stanford. Although exonerations make unique contributions to
the pattern of juvenile death sentences, the contribution is small and has
little effect on the functional form of the relationship between the adjusted
rate of juvenile death sentences and juvenile homicide arrests.
These results shown in Table 14 and Figures 11 and 12 were obtained
for one specific iteration of a broader pattern of analyses of the effects of
exonerations. We conducted similar analyses, varying two parameters.
First, we included alternate measures of state and national exoneration:
prior-year exonerations, and averages for the preceding two- and three-year
intervals. We also varied the source of exonerations (all death penalty
states for national exoneration data versus only juvenile death penalty
states). To assess the robustness of the finding that recent capital
exonerations seem to influence the number and rate of juvenile death
sentences. Regression models similar in form to the models shown in Table
14 were conducted for all possible combinations of these constructions of
the exoneration measure. A total of forty-five regressions were completed.
Table 15 reports the results of the significance test for the interaction term
for models with alternate specifications of within-state and national
exonerations.
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Nine of the forty-five tests (20%) were statistically significant. The
overall pattern is inconsistent; the significant results are concentrated in one
set of models where the within-state measure of exonerations is the total
number of prior capital exonerations for each year in the time series. This
group is the set of models reported in the first three rows of Table 15. The
pattern is the same when national totals are computed for only juvenile
death penalty states and when all death penalty states are considered. When
we examine the state two-year averages, three of the six tests are
significant, again only for within-state capital exonerations. We obtained
significant results when the national measure included either all
exonerations or just capital exonerations. Significant results were obtained
here the national data included all death penalty states or just juvenile death
penalty states, and when the national indicia included either all
exonerations or capital exonerations only.
1 27
The pattern in Table 15 suggests that exonerations do contribute to the
declining trend in juvenile death sentences, but under specific and limited
conditions. Two such conditions are evident from Table 15: the total
number of capital exonerations within the state, or the average number of
exonerations over the previous two years within the state. The rising trend
in total exonerations across the nation seems to influence juvenile death
sentences conditionally on the presence of these within-state trends. Even
when these effects are present, Figures 11 and 12 remind us that capital
exonerations have little measurable influence on the overall pattern of
declining juvenile death sentences. What is more likely is that the decline
in juvenile death sentences and the rise in exonerations are two faces of a
larger temporal trend in capital punishment that points to its decreasing use
in the face of strong evidence of the unreliability of death sentences. That
is, beyond the influence of exonerations, there appears to be a normative
shift away from sentencing juvenile offenders to death.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled in Simmons v. Roper that
the execution of offenders under the age of eighteen violates the evolving
standards of decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments. The Simmons court relied in part
on two objective indicia of an emerging national consensus against the
juvenile death penalty: the growing number of states that have enacted
legislation barring the juvenile death penalty, and the infrequency with
127 The model in this group that combines National 3 year average * State 2 year
average, for Capital Exonerations in All Death Penalty States is the model shown in detail in
Table 14.
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which juries choose to inflict the punishment of death on a juvenile
offender. The Simmons case is now before the Supreme Court, which last
considered the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in 1989 in
Stanford v. Kentucky. The first marker of evolving standards, state
legislation, suggests a steady erosion of support for capital punishment of
juveniles since Stanford. This article analyzes the available data regarding
the second marker of evolving standards: the frequency with which juries
impose the death penalty on juvenile offenders. We conclude that the
decline in the use of the juvenile death penalty since Stanford is evidence of
an emerging societal norm opposing the use of the death penalty for
juveniles.
To reach this conclusion, we analyzed empirical data regarding the use
of the death penalty for adolescent homicide offenders in state courts in the
United States since 1990. The data show that the number of juveniles
sentenced to death (excluding re-sentencings) has declined sharply since
Stanford, from a peak of fifteen in 1994, and a more recent peak of fourteen
in 1999, to one in 2003. (Total death sentences, including re-sentencings,
have shown a similar decline.) The decline in the number of juveniles
sentenced to death since Stanford has been greater than the parallel decline
for adults ages eighteen to twenty-four and for adults twenty-five and over,
suggesting an age-specific decline. The decline in juveniles sentenced to
death is striking, and is greater than the analogous decline for adults, even
after the sentencing rate is indexed to the declining homicide rate and to the
declining homicide arrest rate.
Comparing the states, we found that the declines for juveniles are
greater than for adults both in the highest juvenile death sentencing states
and in other states, when we index the sentencing rate to the homicide arrest
rate. Texas is an outlier for death sentences, but the pattern of decline in
death sentences in Texas and other high-rate states is comparable to the rest
of the states that permit death sentences for juveniles.
Using two types of multivariate statistical analyses, we found that the
decline in juvenile death sentences is statistically significant (greater than
chance) after we control for competing explanations for its decline: the
decline in the murder rate, the decline in the number of juveniles arrested
for homicide, secular declines in death sentences for other age groups,
changes in the size of the youth population, changing political and social
contexts, and changes in the general punitiveness of the criminal justice
system. The results are consistent across different measurement and
analysis conditions.
We also examined the effects of the growing number of innocence
cases on the declining rates of juvenile death sentences. We find evidence
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that the combined effects of recent capital innocence cases both within
juvenile death sentencing states and across the nation exerted a downward
pressure on juvenile death sentences, controlling for murder rates and
juvenile homicide arrest rates. Although capital innocence cases may have
contributed to the reluctance of juries to impose death sentences on
juveniles, the accumulation of innocence cases is contemporaneous with the
trend that we observed for juvenile death sentences. Both trends are a
function of time: the increase in innocence cases and the decline of juvenile
death sentences. Both contribute reciprocally to the evolving social and
legal norms opposing the use of the death penalty for juveniles.
There is compelling evidence, even in the states that theoretically
permit the use of the juvenile death penalty, of an emerging societal norm
opposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders-which has in the last
several years reduced the number of juveniles sentenced to death almost to
zero. Its disuse signals that the juvenile death penalty may no longer be
needed.
[Vol. 95
Table Cl. Data Description, Means, Standard Deviations
Variable
Persons Under 18 Sentenced to Death
Homicide Arrests Under 18 (Logged)
Time
Time 2
Binary: Year Greater Than 1999
Persons 18-24 Sentenced to Death (Logged)
Time * Year Greater Than 1999
Time 2 * Year Greater Than 1999
Murder Rate (Logged)
Residual of Homicide Rate
Population Under 18 (Logged)
Ratio: Black/White Homicide Victimization Rate
White Homicide Victimization Rate
Percent Black Population




National 3 Year Average
State 2 Year Average
Interaction
Standard
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
0.00 7.00 0.34 0.86
0.00 5.91 2.96 1.43
1.00 14.00 7.38 4.02
1.00 196.00 70.55 61.56
0.00 1.00 0.27 0.45
0.00 3.04 0.92 0.88
0.00 14.00 3.40 5.60
0.00 196.00 42.80 71.53
0.19 3.06 1.92 0.59
-4.64 4.42 0.04 1.53
11.65 15.59 13.55 0.95
0.00 35.27 5.56 4.23
0.90 12.85 5.09 2.39
0.00 0.37 0.13 0.11
22.91 92.25 66.56 14.28
3.00 9.00 7.27 1.90
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